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I. INTRODUCTION 
If the President makes decisions by default on national security, the 
President’s only judges are the lawyers who provide the President with 
advice.1  Because of threshold doctrines such as standing and political 
questions, courts often do not encounter the most difficult and important 
questions.2  Moreover, the President and Congress often develop a course of 
dealing over time that settles the distribution of power between them.3  By 
standing in for courts and interpreting both case law and the political 
branches’ course of dealing, few lawyers practice with higher stakes than 
those at the Justice Department’s elite Office of Legal Counsel (OLC).4  
However, because of the stilted advice of OLC staffers in the eighteen 
months after the September 11 attacks, few lawyers have received as much 
criticism.5 
A broad consensus has developed that the lawyers who provided 
President Bush with legal advice in the aftermath of September 11 did not 
 
 1.  See Trevor W. Morrison, Stare Decisis in the Office of Legal Counsel, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 
1448, 1460–68 (2010) [hereinafter Morrison, Stare Decisis in OLC] (discussing particular features of 
OLC). 
 2.  See id. at 1480 n.132 (noting threshold doctrines of standing, ripeness, and mootness, which 
limit adjudication on the merits). 
 3.  See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579, 610–11 (1952) 
(Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“[A] systematic, unbroken, executive practice, long pursued to the 
knowledge of the Congress and never before questioned . . . may be treated as a gloss on ‘executive 
Power’ vested in the President . . . .”). 
 4.  See JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY: LAW AND JUDGMENT INSIDE THE BUSH 
ADMINISTRATION 71–98 (2007); Dawn E. Johnsen, Faithfully Executing the Laws: Internal Legal 
Constraints on Executive Power, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1559 (2007); Morrison, Stare Decisis in OLC, 
supra note 1, at 1458–70; Randolph D. Moss, Executive Branch Legal Interpretation: A Perspective 
from the Office of Legal Counsel, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 1303 (2000); Cornelia T.L. Pillard, The 
Unfulfilled Promise of the Constitution in Executive Hands, 103 MICH. L. REV. 676 (2005); see also 
John O. McGinnis, Models of the Opinion Function of the Attorney General: A Normative, 
Descriptive, and Historical Prolegomenon, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 375, 407–19 (1993) (discussing 
the history of Attorney General opinions and OLC). 
 5.  See, e.g., W. Bradley Wendel, Legal Ethics and the Separation of Law and Morals, 91 
CORNELL L. REV. 67, 80–85 (2005) (arguing that OLC lawyers contravened a settled public 
understanding regarding interrogation). 
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adequately consider the special responsibilities they had assumed.6  In 
authorizing coercive interrogation techniques7 and a broad program of 
warrantless surveillance without securing congressional approval,8 these 
lawyers allowed the President to operate with minimal accountability and set 
the stage for a pushback from Congress,9 the courts,10 and global public 
opinion.11  Although more conscientious Bush Administration lawyers 
withdrew some of the more sweeping memos after the initial period12 and 
the Obama Administration has repudiated the rest,13 the question of who 
controls legal advice to the President continues to spur controversy.  
Commentators debate the appropriateness of sanctions for OLC lawyers14 
and the design and substantive mandate of OLC. 
 
 6.  For a discerning account by the lawyer and academic who withdrew a number of the 
opinions generated in those early days, see GOLDSMITH, supra note 4.  For other critical 
commentary, see BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 95–110 
(2010); HAROLD H. BRUFF, BAD ADVICE: BUSH’S LAWYERS IN THE WAR ON TERROR (2009); DAVID 
LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS AND HUMAN DIGNITY 162, 176–80, 200–02 (2007); Kathleen Clark, Ethical 
Issues Raised by the OLC Torture Memorandum, 1 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 455 (2005); 
Stephen Gillers, Legal Ethics: A Debate, in THE TORTURE DEBATE IN AMERICA 236, 237–38 (Karen 
J. Greenberg ed., 2006); Peter Margulies, True Believers at Law: National Security Agendas, the 
Regulation of Lawyers, and the Separation of Powers, 68 MD. L. REV. 1 (2008) [hereinafter 
Margulies, True Believers]; Wendel, supra note 5; Fred C. Zacharias, Practice, Theory, and the War 
on Terror, 59 EMORY L.J. 333, 338–48 (2009); cf. Norman W. Spaulding, Professional 
Independence in the Office of the Attorney General, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1931, 1975–76 (2008) 
[hereinafter Spaulding, Professional Independence] (arguing that the problems with OLC advice 
stemmed from ideological allegiances of lawyers, not from timidity on the lawyers’ part). 
 7.  See Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Att’y Gen., to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel 
to President, Standards of Conduct for Interrogation Under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340–2340A (Aug. 1, 
2002), in THE TORTURE PAPERS: THE ROAD TO ABU GHRAIB 172 (Karen J. Greenberg & Joshua L. 
Dratel eds., 2005) [hereinafter Bybee Memo]. 
 8.  See GABRIELLA BLUM & PHILIP B. HEYMANN, LAWS, OUTLAWS AND TERRORISTS: LESSONS 
FROM THE WAR ON TERRORISM 54–56 (2010). 
 9.  See CHARLIE SAVAGE, TAKEOVER: THE RETURN OF THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY AND THE 
SUBVERSION OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 220–23 (2007) (discussing the McCain Amendment, 
which barred torture by the United States military). 
 10.  See PETER MARGULIES, LAW’S DETOUR: JUSTICE DISPLACED IN THE BUSH 
ADMINISTRATION 56–57 (2010).  Initial revelations about abuses at Abu Ghraib were made on the 
same day as oral argument in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004), in which counsel for the 
government had assured Justices that the government did not engage in torture.  MARGULIES, supra, 
at 56–57.  The Court shortly thereafter required due process safeguards for detention of suspected 
terrorists.  Id. 
 11.  See José E. Alvarez, Torturing the Law, 37 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 175, 215–21 (2006). 
 12.  See GOLDSMITH, supra note 4, at 142–62. 
 13.  See Memorandum from David J. Barron, Acting Assistant Att’y Gen., Withdrawal of Office 
of Legal Counsel CIA Interrogation Opinions (Apr. 15, 2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/ 
olc/2009/withdrawalofficelegalcounsel.pdf. 
 14.  See David D. Cole, The Sacrificial Yoo: Accounting for Torture in the OPR Report, 4 J. 
NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 455, 463 (2010) (calling for government commission); Claire 
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The imposition of legal sanctions on John Yoo, the Berkeley law 
professor who, as an OLC lawyer, authored the most controversial opinions, 
remains unsettled.  The Obama Administration completed an extensive 
review of Yoo’s work by overruling a recommendation by one unit within 
the Justice Department, the Office of Professional Responsibility, to refer 
Yoo’s case to state ethics regulators for disciplinary action such as 
suspension or disbarment.15  However, a Bivens suit that seeks damages 
against Yoo remains alive in federal court.16 
In addition, a substantial number of proposals have emerged for 
reforming OLC and Executive Branch legal advice.  Some of these 
proposals, such as Bruce Ackerman’s recent call for a “Supreme Executive 
Tribunal,”17 would change OLC’s structure to ensure the independence of 
the advice received.  Others seek to enhance deliberation within OLC by 
requiring consideration of opposing views18 and outlining a regime of stare 
decisis for OLC advice.19  Still others aim for substantive guidance, arguing 
 
Finkelstein, When Government Lawyers Break the Law: The Case for Prosecution, 158 U. PA. L. 
REV. PENNUMBRA 196 (2010), available at http://www.pennumbra.com/debates/pdfs/ 
AuthorizingTorture.pdf (arguing for criminal prosecution); cf. George D. Brown, Accountability, 
Liability, and the War on Terror—Constitutional Tort Suits as Truth and Reconciliation Vehicles, 63 
FLA. L. REV. 193, 234–37 (2011) (warning of unintended consequences of truth commissions and 
tort liability); Stephen I. Vladeck, Justice Jackson, the Memory of Internment, and the Rule of Law 
After the Bush Administration, in WHEN GOVERNMENTS BREAK THE LAW: THE RULE OF LAW AND 
THE PROSECUTION OF THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION 183, 201–06 (Austin Sarat & Nasser Hussain 
eds., 2010) (discussing the appropriateness of formal versus informal sanctions). 
 15.  See Office of Prof’l Responsibility, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Investigation into the Office of 
Legal Counsel’s Memoranda Concerning Issues Relating to the Central Intelligence Agency’s Use of 
“Enhanced Interrogation Techniques” on Suspected Terrorists (July 29, 2009) [hereinafter OPR 
Report], available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/OPRFinalReport090729.pdf 
(recommendation referring Yoo to state regulatory authorities); David Margolis, Assoc. Deputy 
Att’y Gen., Memorandum for the Attorney General (Jan. 5, 2010), at 67 [hereinafter DOJ Final 
Report], available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/DAGMargolisMemo100105.pdf 
(rejecting OPR’s recommendation regarding Yoo). 
 16.  See Padilla v. Yoo, 633 F. Supp. 2d 1005, 1031 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (holding that Yoo’s claim 
of qualified immunity did not require dismissal of lawsuit). 
 17.  See ACKERMAN, supra note 6, at 143–50 (calling for the establishment of a “Supreme 
Executive Tribunal”); Neal Kumar Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today’s Most 
Dangerous Branch from Within, 115 YALE L.J. 2314, 2336–40 (2006) [hereinafter Katyal, Internal 
Separation of Powers] (proposing a quasi-adjudicative body as a replacement for OLC); Norman W. 
Spaulding, Independence and Experimentalism in the Department of Justice, 63 STAN. L. REV. 409, 
435–39 (2011) [hereinafter Spaulding, Independence and Experimentalism] (suggesting that 
Congress restrict the President’s power to fire the OLC supervisor); see also Bruce Ackerman, Lost 
Inside the Beltway: A Reply to Professor Morrison, 124 HARV. L. REV. F. 13 (2011) (responding to 
Morrison’s critique of proposals); cf. Pillard, supra note 4, at 748–58 (discussing other structural 
reforms at OLC, including a role for the Justice Department’s Office of the Inspector General); Eric 
A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, The Credible Executive, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 865, 896–909 (2007) 
[hereinafter Posner & Vermeule, The Credible Executive] (criticizing Katyal’s model as utopian, but 
suggesting pragmatic substitutes such as bipartisan appointments). 
 18.  See Johnsen, supra note 4. 
 19.  See Morrison, Stare Decisis in OLC, supra note 1. 
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that OLC lawyers should adhere to “mainstream” legal interpretations,20 but 
suggesting that the President has the power to disregard such advice in 
demonstrably exigent situations.21  Another cohort highlights more informal 
modes of accountability, such as disclosure,22 that will allow Congress and 
the public to appreciate the reasoning of Executive Branch lawyers. 
This Article critiques such proposals, arguing that both formal sanctions 
and structural reform yield unintended consequences.  One problem is that 
commentators proposing reforms fight the last war.23  They recite a 
monolithic narrative that focuses on the dangers of executive overreaching, 
but often exchange one species of myopia for another.24  Because of the 
tenor of Bush Administration policy, critics neglect the far more varied 
trajectory of executive power over time.25 
The Bush Administration presents a simple case for critics of executive 
power.  President Bush and Vice President Cheney were confirmed 
unilateralists, rending the fabric of separation of powers by refusing to 
consult Congress.26  Moreover, on an issue such as coercive interrogation, 
Bush Administration officials used that power to reduce human rights and 
civil liberties here and abroad.27  However, prior Administrations have taken 
actions that interact in a more complex way with both the separation of 
powers and the framework of human rights.28  Prior to America’s entry into 
World War II, for example, then-Attorney General Robert Jackson 
authorized the destroyer deal, which aided Britain in its lonely fight against 
 
 20.  See BLUM & HEYMANN, supra note 8, at 54–56 (arguing that OLC must provide opinions 
within the legal “mainstream”). 
 21.  Id. at 55 (invoking the example of Jefferson and Lincoln); Gabriella Blum, The Role of the 
Client: The President’s Role in Government Lawyering, 32 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 275, 281 
(2009) (arguing that the executive must assume responsibility for doing what is right even if her 
lawyers disagree); cf. OREN GROSS & FIONNUALA NÍ AOLÁIN, LAW IN TIMES OF CRISIS: 
EMERGENCY POWERS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 123–27 (2006) (analyzing Jefferson’s view as a 
rationale for “extra-legal” action by the President); Oren Gross, Chaos and Rules: Should Responses 
to Violent Crisis Always Be Constitutional?, 112 YALE L.J. 1011, 1099–109 (2003) (same).  For 
further discussion of Gross’s view, see Noa Ben-Asher, Legalism and Decisionism in Crisis, 71 
OHIO ST. L.J. 699, 714–15 (2010). 
 22.  Gross, supra note 21, at 1099–109; Sudha Setty, No More Secret Laws: How Transparency 
of Executive Branch Legal Policy Doesn’t Let the Terrorists Win, 57 U. KAN. L. REV. 579, 602–05 
(2009). 
 23.  See infra Part III. 
 24.  See infra Part III. 
 25.  See infra Part III. 
 26.  See MARGULIES, supra note 10, at 8–10. 
 27.  See Setty, supra note 22, at 589–94. 
 28.  See infra notes 295–314 and accompanying text. 
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Nazi Germany.29  Jackson’s interpretive style in the opinion foreshadowed 
John Yoo’s by straining statutes to the breaking point.30  However, Jackson’s 
advice was part of a public debate that led, within months, to the Lend Lease 
Act, which codified aid to Britain.31  Moreover, the substance of Jackson’s 
advice also invoked a post-war international order with greater protections 
against aggression and genocide.32  More recently, President Clinton 
exercised power to promote human rights, through the NATO intervention in 
Kosovo.33  Clinton’s unilateralism may have been as deplorable as Bush’s; 
or it could have been commendable on its own terms, but worth curbing to 
protect the separation of powers.  However, critics of the Bush-era OLC 
rarely even consider such questions.34 
Problems await any response to the excesses of the Bush Administration 
OLC.  As critics of the Bush Administration have noted, an absence of 
sanctions risks impunity for official overreaching and discourages officials 
from crafting more tempered alternatives.35  However, formal legal 
sanctions, such as disbarment or damages, also create problems.  Formal 
legal sanctions can trigger procedural injustices, such as a lack of notice, that 
a nation guided by the rule of law should prevent.36  Sanctions and structural 
reforms can crowd out courses of dealing between the political branches that 
have traditionally promoted flexibility in foreign and domestic affairs.37  
Finally, constraining OLC can also increase polarization, as a President 
inclined toward unilateralism bypasses OLC altogether and seeks advice 
from other government lawyers without OLC’s pedigree of balance and 
discernment.38 
To avoid these problems, reform should center on maintaining an ethic 
of dialogic equipoise.39  All lawyers need to maintain a balance between 
serving a client and preserving the integrity of the legal system.40  Lawyers 
 
 29.  See Acquisition of Naval & Air Bases in Exch. for Over-Age Destroyers, 39 Op. Att’y Gen. 
484, 486–88 (1940) [hereinafter Jackson op.]; cf. ROBERT H. JACKSON, THAT MAN: AN INSIDER’S 
PORTRAIT OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 93–103 (John Q. Barrett ed., 2003) (discussing the context 
of the destroyer deal). 
 30.  See Jackson op., supra note 29, at 494–96 (interpreting very narrowly a statute making it 
unlawful for the United States to send any vessel of war to a belligerent nation). 
 31.  See An Act to Promote the Defense of the United States (Lend-Lease Act), Pub. L. No. 77-
11, § 3(b), 55 Stat. 31, 32 (1941). 
 32.  See Jonathan A. Bush, “The Supreme . . . Crime” and its Origins: The Lost Legislative 
History of the Crime of Aggressive War, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 2324, 2365–66 (2002). 
 33.  See LOUIS HENKIN ET AL., HUMAN RIGHTS 548–49 (2d ed. 2009). 
 34.  See infra Part III.A.2. 
 35.  See infra Part II.A. 
 36.  See infra Part II.B. 
 37.  See infra Part II.C. 
 38.  See infra Part II.D. 
 39.  See Margulies, True Believers, supra note 6, at 66–67. 
 40.  See id. 
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in the Executive Branch face the same challenge.41  If they unduly discount 
the interests of the President, they risk being cut out of the loop.42  
Cumbersome adjudicative models have this failing—the President can leave 
the structure unused, like a stately mansion which no one can afford to 
maintain.43  However, a failure to situate the President in the overall 
constitutional fabric can render the President’s initiatives unsustainable.44  
For this precarious balance to work, lawyers need to encourage dialog within 
the Executive Branch, among the other branches, and with the public.45 
Dialogic equipoise entails four factors for OLC opinions that expand 
presidential power.  First, the action authorized must have a compelling 
sovereignty- or human rights-centered rationale that prevents irreparable 
harm or exploits a fleeting opportunity.46  Second, the action must present a 
reasonable likelihood of ratification by Congress.47  Third, the action cannot 
violate any other constitutional norms, such as those found in the Bill of 
Rights or the Equal Protection Clause.48  Fourth, and most controversially, 
advice authorizing an expansive view of presidential power must fit within a 
numerical cap that budgets OLC’s institutional capital.49 
This Article is divided into five parts.  Part II, which addresses the risks 
and benefits of reform strategies, suggests that overly timid reforms risk a 
climate of impunity, while heedless or hasty reforms can upset reliance 
interests and yield paralysis or polarization.50  Part III focuses on the OLC 
interrogation opinions and discusses the virtues and vices of formal 
sanctions like disbarment and damages.51  It concludes that while OLC’s 
opinions richly merit condemnation, formal sanctions would violate 
principles of notice and discount a history of aggressive interpretation that 
dates back to the Founding Era.  Part IV analyzes structural fixes for OLC, 
including Ackerman’s Supreme Executive Tribunal.52  It pinpoints the 
constitutional and policy problems of structural reforms, which combine the 
disadvantages of courts and executive departments.  Part V, which traces 
 
 41.  See id. at 66. 
 42.  See id. 
 43.  See infra text accompanying notes 199–203. 
 44.  See infra notes 189–96 and accompanying text. 
 45.  See Margulies, True Believers, supra note 6, at 67. 
 46.  See infra Part VI.A. 
 47.  See infra pp. 853–54. 
 48.  See infra note 294 and accompanying text. 
 49.  See infra Part VI.C. 
 50.  See infra Part II. 
 51.  See infra Part III. 
 52.  See infra Part IV. 
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substantive and deliberative reforms, argues that requiring a purely objective 
analysis unaffected by Executive Branch interests produces unduly rigid 
legal advice.53  Deliberative reforms, such as a commitment to disclosure, 
consultation with other government agencies, and stare decisis, are more 
promising.  Finally, Part VI advances a model of dialogic equipoise that 
husbands OLC’s institutional capital and elicits executive decisions that are 
both disciplined and effective.54 
II.   REFORM’S RISKS AND REWARDS 
Any effort to move beyond institutional failures such as the OLC 
memos on interrogation entails several risks.  The absence of sanctions can 
embolden future Executives to overreach.55  However, an eagerness to 
impose sanctions can vitiate procedural justice.56  Sanctions and structural 
reforms can induce paralysis or even prompt polarization.57  Workable 
reforms must navigate through these obstacles. 
A.  The Hazards of Impunity 
Failed or timid reform can foster a climate of impunity which attaches 
no cost to former officials’ overreaching.  This can send the unhealthy 
message that overreaching is regrettable but that officials need not go out of 
their way to avoid it.  In Ashcroft v. Iqbal,58 for example, the Court held that 
senior federal officials could not be liable for failing to properly supervise 
subordinates who engaged in abuse of post-9/11 immigration detainees,59 
even if the defendants knew of the abuse.60  In his opinion for the majority, 
Justice Kennedy described the roundup of undocumented Muslim 
noncitizens after September 11 as a “legitimate policy directing law 
enforcement to arrest and detain individuals because of their suspected link 
 
 53.  See infra Part V. 
 54.  See infra Part VI. 
 55.  See infra Part II.A. 
 56.  See infra Part II.B. 
 57.  See infra Part II.C–D. 
 58.  129 S. Ct. 1937, 1954 (2009). 
 59.  See OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE SEPTEMBER 11 
DETAINEES: A REVIEW OF THE TREATMENT OF ALIENS HELD ON IMMIGRATION CHARGES IN 
CONNECTION WITH THE INVESTIGATION OF THE SEPTEMBER 11 ATTACKS, 10–17 (2003), 
http://usdoj.gov/oig/special/0306/full.pdf [hereinafter OIG Sept. 11 Report].  The claims in the case 
arose from a roundup that targeted undocumented aliens from the Middle East and South Asia.  See 
id.  For a discussion of profiling and counterterrorism policy, see DAVID COLE & JULES LOBEL, LESS 
SAFE, LESS FREE: WHY AMERICA IS LOSING THE WAR ON TERROR 30–31 (2007) (discussing the 
post-9/11 roundup); MARGULIES, supra note 10, at 28–30.  Cf. Stephen J. Ellmann, Racial Profiling 
and Terrorism, 46 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 675 (2002–2003) (discussing profiling techniques). 
 60.  See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1952 (finding that officials “cannot be held liable unless they 
themselves acted on account of a constitutionally protected characteristic” (emphasis added)). 
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to the attacks.”61  The government’s own report portrayed the roundup as far 
more chaotic, characterized by wholesale arrests of undocumented aliens 
with no demonstrable connection to terrorism.62  However, the tangled 
doctrinal basis for the Court’s holding, which conflated supervisory and 
respondeat superior liability,63 demonstrated that the Court was unduly eager 
to insulate Executive Branch officials from the foreseeable consequences of 
their actions. 
B.  Procedural Injustice and the Rule of Law 
Procedural injustice is another risk of transitions.  Many transitions from 
overreaching crystallize understandings about what constitutes illegal 
conduct.64  Prior to that crystallization, however, ambiguity surrounds the 
relevant law.65  Interpretations of the law that resolve ambiguity in favor of a 
defendant uphold the “fundamental principle” of legality: “[N]o citizen 
should be held accountable for a violation of a statute whose commands are 
uncertain, or subjected to punishment that is not clearly prescribed.”66  
Unfortunately, fair notice is often a casualty of the popular outcry for 
punishment of officials who have allegedly overreached.67  Overreaching 
 
 61.  Id. at 1951. 
 62.  See OIG Sept. 11 Report, supra note 59, at 16–17 (reporting that agents received over 
96,000 leads, including one asserting only that the target worked in a grocery store “‘operated by 
numerous Middle Eastern men’”). 
 63.  Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (asserting that the case was governed by the principle that, in 
lawsuits seeking damages for constitutional violations, “masters [should] not answer for the torts of 
their servants”).  However, the supervisory liability theory advanced by the Iqbal plaintiffs required 
a showing of recklessness by those in charge.  Id. at 1952.  In contrast, under respondeat superior, 
even non-negligent principals are liable for their agents’ torts.  Id. at 1958 (Souter, J., dissenting) 
(citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.04 (2005)).  Appellate courts had repeatedly held that 
supervisory recklessness could trigger liability.  See Int’l Action Ctr. v. United States, 365 F.3d 20, 
28 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (“‘The supervisor[] must know about the conduct and facilitate it, approve it, 
condone it, or turn a blind eye for fear of what they might see.’” (quoting Jones v. City of Chi., 856 
F.2d 985, 992 (7th Cir. 1988))). 
 64.  See Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Transitional Justice as Ordinary Justice, 117 
HARV. L. REV. 761, 791–800 (2004) [hereinafter Posner & Vermeule, Transitional Justice] 
(discussing retroactive justice after regime changes, and the procedural legality of punishing the old 
regime under the new regime’s laws). 
 65.  See id. 
 66.  United States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507, 514 (2008).  International law has traditionally 
attached great importance to legality as a principle.  See DAVID LUBAN, JULIE R. O’SULLIVAN & 
DAVID P. STEWART, INTERNATIONAL AND CRIMINAL LAW 14–15 (2010) (discussing legal principles 
requiring fair notice that conduct violates the law). 
 67.  See Mark A. Drumbl, Rule of Law Amid Lawlessness: Counseling the Accused in Rwanda’s 
Domestic Genocide Trials, 29 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 545, 616–17 (1998) (discussing problems 
with notice in genocide prosecutions). 
DO NOT DELETE 4/20/2012  1:25 PM 
 
818 
officials’ eager embrace of procedural rights that they blithely deny others 
deserves a chapter all of its own in the annals of legal irony.68  However, 
procedural rights do not merely benefit those who invoke them.  Like other 
measures that we can justify on rule-utilitarian grounds, they benefit society, 
even when the case for exceptions seems compelling.69  As Hamilton noted, 
the prospect of judicial enforcement of rights prompts emerging majorities 
and their representatives to “qualify their attempts” at shortcuts around the 
rule of law.70  Ignoring notice undermines this salutary check, even when 
poetic justice identifies sanctions’ targets. 
C.  Reform and Paralysis 
Another problem is paralysis.  Hindsight bias makes it easy to second-
guess officials for actions that may seem hasty or shortsighted from the 
convenient perch of retrospect, but were in fact difficult decisions made with 
a sparse menu of options.71  Officials fearful of subsequent second-guessing 
may become unduly risk averse, taking no action when action is needed.72 
Because of the need to avoid paralysis in national security matters, 
informal courses of dealing between the branches have often been 
substituted for more formal sources of authority.  Justice Jackson noted in 
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer that “congressional inertia, 
indifference or quiescence may sometimes, at least as a practical matter, 
enable, if not invite, measures on independent presidential responsibility.”73  
 
 68.  See Stephen Holmes, The Spider’s Web: How Government Lawbreakers Routinely Elude the 
Law, in WHEN GOVERNMENTS BREAK THE LAW: THE RULE OF LAW AND THE PROSECUTION OF THE 
BUSH ADMINISTRATION 121, 141 (Austin Sarat & Nasser Hussain eds., 2010) (describing this 
tendency as “irritating”). 
 69.  See Ruti Teitel, Transitional Jurisprudence: The Role of Law in Political Transformation, 
106 YALE L.J. 2009, 2022–23 (1997) (addressing the need for justice and fairness to establish 
equality under the law, even if some criminals go unpunished). 
 70.  See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 470 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
 71.  Conferring qualified immunity on officials helps mitigate the ill-effects of hindsight bias.  
See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 807 (1982); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Some Confusion About 
Due Process, Judicial Review, and Constitutional Remedies, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 309, 338–39 (1993) 
(analyzing judicial efforts to balance constitutional rights and official discretion in damages actions).  
See generally Peter H. Schuck, Suing Our Servants: The Courts, Congress, and the Liability of 
Public Officials for Damages, 1980 SUP. CT. REV. 281 (arguing that damages actions can produce 
undue official risk aversion). 
 72.  See Schuck, supra note 71, at 299–301. 
 73.  Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) 
(Jackson, J., concurring); see also id. at 610–11 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (discussing legislative 
acquiescence as triggering judicial deference); Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981) 
(upholding presidential negotiation of claims settlement with Iran); United States v. Midwest Oil 
Co., 236 U.S. 459 (1915) (upholding the power of the President, in a case involving congressional 
acquiescence, to safeguard federal land for conservation and orderly development); cf. WILLIAM C. 
BANKS & PETER RAVEN-HANSEN, NATIONAL SECURITY LAW AND THE POWER OF THE PURSE 121–
29 (1994) (discussing what authors call “customary national security law”); HAROLD H. BRUFF, 
BALANCE OF FORCES: SEPARATION OF POWERS LAW IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 102–05 (2006) 
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At key junctures, officials pushed the envelope of formal legal authority and 
subsequently sought congressional or public ratification for their efforts.74  
Washington’s Neutrality Proclamation is perhaps the earliest example.75  
Washington interpreted a treaty with France in a narrow manner that kept 
America out of foreign conflicts, using presidential authority in a manner 
that seems prudent in retrospect but was controversial at the time.76  Since 
then, presidents from Jefferson to Clinton have taken the initiative to 
preserve the status quo and to advance emerging norms of individual and 
human rights with the expectation that Congress would ratify their choices.77  
A rule that minimized overreaching but impaired this flexible course of 
dealing would exalt form over functionality.78 
D.  Polarization and Reform’s Reversal 
Polarization can be an additional ill-effect of attempted reforms.  Undue 
emphasis on formal sanctions can cause this phenomenon.  So can structural 
reforms that make legal advice too cumbersome to obtain. 
The challenges faced by transitions from dictatorship abroad 
demonstrate that a rigid focus on formal legal sanctions can undermine the 
new regime.79  Those out of power believe that sanctions amount to “victor’s 
 
(discussing Midwest Oil); Morrison, Stare Decisis in OLC, supra note 1, at 1498 (arguing “that 
within OLC, its own body of executive power precedents is a critical piece of the broader historical 
practice informing its understanding of the law”); Curtis A., Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, 
Historical Gloss and the Separation of Powers, 126 HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1999516 (arguing that historical patterns of acquiescence are a legitimate 
basis for constitutional interpretation, but that some caveats apply). 
 74.  See BLUM & HEYMANN, supra note 8, at 20 (citing urgency as a justification for executive 
action before legislative approval). 
 75.  George Washington, Proclamation of Neutrality (Apr. 22, 1793), reprinted in 32 THE 
WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON FROM THE ORIGINAL MANUSCRIPT SOURCES 1745–1799, at 
430–31 (John C. Fitzpatrick ed., 1939). 
 76.  See Martin S. Flaherty, The Story of the Neutrality Controversy: Struggling Over 
Presidential Power Outside the Courts, in PRESIDENTIAL POWER STORIES 21, 29–39 (Christopher H. 
Schroeder & Curtis A. Bradley eds., 2009). 
 77.  See BLUM & HEYMANN, supra note 8, at 55 (alluding to the Louisiana Purchase); id. at 45 
(discussing Kosovo intervention). 
 78.  See Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Chevronizing Foreign Relations Law, 116 YALE L.J. 
1170, 1209–10 (2007) (noting the need for the Executive to be able to enact flexible responses to 
rapidly changing circumstances).  But see Deborah N. Pearlstein, After Deference: Formalizing the 
Judicial Power for Foreign Relations Law, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 783 (2011) (arguing that a functional 
view leads to undue deference). 
 79.  See Posner & Vermeule, Transitional Justice, supra note 64, at 769 (noting the ill-effects of 
rigid adherence). 
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justice,” and lose any stake in transition’s success.80  The ancient Athenians 
discovered this to their chagrin, as their government moved from oligarchy 
to democracy four times within eight years.81  After an initial round of 
sanctions against the oligarchs proved counterproductive, Athenian 
democrats opted for a reconciliation brokered by Sparta.82  More recent 
transitions in Eastern Europe83 and Iraq84 have exhibited the same tendency. 
For this reason, pragmatism has informed approaches to criminal 
prosecution of overreaching officials in the United States.  Lincoln declined 
to prosecute most officials of the Confederacy, asserting that formal 
sanctions such as penalties for treason would impair reconciliation.85  Later, 
President Ford pardoned President Nixon, and presidents have pardoned 
others in the national security apparatus.86  Moreover, the one institutional 
effort to promote prosecution of American officials was a clear failure.87  
According to a bipartisan consensus, the Independent Counsel statute, 
enacted in the wake of Watergate, criminalized political disputes and thereby 
 
 80.  See Gene Bykhovsky, An Argument Against Assertion of Universal Jurisdiction by 
Individual States, 21 WIS. INT’L L.J. 161, 181 (2003) (citing the lack of credibility in “victor’s 
justice,” and the risks of pursuing criminal prosecutions in a new regime). 
 81.  See JON ELSTER, CLOSING THE BOOKS: TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN HISTORICAL 
PERSPECTIVE 4–22 (2004). 
 82.  Id. at 21. 
 83.  See Denise V. Powers & James H. Cox, Echoes from the Past: The Relationship Between 
Satisfaction with Economic Reforms and Voting Behavior in Poland, 91 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 617, 
628 (1997) (discussing popular disillusionment yielded by stress in rooting out former Communist 
functionaries). 
 84.  See Jeremy Sarkin & Heather Sensibaugh, How Historical Events and Relationships Shape 
Current Attempts at Reconciliation in Iraq, 26 WIS. INT’L L.J. 1033, 1064–65 (2009) (noting that the 
initial American policy of rooting out Ba’athists from the government had ruinous results, turning 
many Iraqis toward armed opposition to United States efforts).  But see MICHAEL A. NEWTON & 
MICHAEL P. SCHARF, ENEMY OF THE STATE: THE TRIAL AND EXECUTION OF SADDAM HUSSEIN 
181–83 (2008) (praising some post-Saddam Iraqi prosecutions, including the case of Judge Awad al-
Bandar, which constituted the first conviction since the post-World War II era of a judge for 
violating human rights). 
 85.  See DANIEL FARBER, LINCOLN’S CONSTITUTION 100–01 (2003) (discussing the clear legal 
basis for treason prosecutions of Confederate officials and combatants, which never occurred). 
 86.  See Kathleen Clark, Government Lawyers and Confidentiality Norms, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 
1033, 1040 n.21 (2007) (discussing President Reagan’s pardon of Mark Felt, an FBI official who had 
authorized warrantless searches and had also, unbeknownst to Reagan, been “Deep Throat,” 
Woodward and Bernstein’s legendary source for stories about the Watergate scandal).  In the early 
Cold War period, covert operatives and interrogators apparently received advance pardons for 
activities that might otherwise have triggered prosecution.  See also JOHN T. PARRY, 
UNDERSTANDING TORTURE 142–45 (2010) (discussing Cold War interrogation tactics, conducted 
with the consent of senior officials); William Ranney Levi, Interrogation’s Law, 118 YALE L.J. 
1434, 1465–67 (2009) (noting that President Truman provided a standing pardon to CIA Director 
Walter Bedell Smith for the CIA’s use of consciousness-altering chemicals and other techniques on 
putative Soviet defectors and other subjects). 
 87.  See Ethics in Government Act of 1978, 28 U.S.C. §§ 49, 591–599 (2006). 
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polarized political debate.88  For example, during the investigation of the 
Monica Lewinsky episode,89 political opponents cast President Clinton’s 
moves against al Qaeda as a “wag the dog” strategy to change the subject.90  
The nation’s interest in an effective approach to al Qaeda suffered. 
Structural reform can also exacerbate polarization.  The President need 
not seek OLC’s advice, if doing so creates undue disruption or delay.91  
When seeking advice from OLC becomes too cumbersome, a president will 
seek advice from lawyers who are closer at hand, including the White House 
Counsel.  Policy blunders have proliferated when insular power players have 
shut out sources of advice within the Executive Branch.  During the Reagan 
Administration, the primary actors in the Iran-Contra affair froze out the 
Office of the Legal Adviser in the State Department.92  The second Bush 
Administration established a “working group” to assess interrogation 
techniques, but then bypassed most of the group’s members.93  Champions 
 
 88.  See CHARLES FRIED, ORDER AND LAW: ARGUING THE REAGAN REVOLUTION—A FIRST 
HAND ACCOUNT 135 (1991) (discussing congressional Democrats’ efforts to criminalize stance on 
access to government documents by then-OLC head Ted Olson); Daniel C. Richman & William J. 
Stuntz, Al Capone’s Revenge: An Essay on the Political Economy of Pretextual Prosecution, 105 
COLUM. L. REV. 583, 591, 598 (2005) (discussing Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr’s 
investigation of Bill Clinton).  Mutual realization of the statute’s noxious effects led Congress to 
allow it to sunset.  See 28 U.S.C. § 599 (1994) (providing that the Independent Counsel 
Reauthorization Act of 1994 expires five years after the date of enactment). 
 89.  See Richman & Stuntz, supra note 88. 
 90.  See Todd S. Purdum, U.S. Fury on 2 Continents: Congress; Critics of Clinton Support 
Attacks, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 1998, at A1 (quoting Republican Senators Dan Coats of Indiana and 
Arlen Specter of Pennsylvania as expressing skepticism about the purpose and timing of attacks on a 
suspected al Qaeda camp in Afghanistan). 
 91.  See Nelson Lund, Rational Choice at the Office of Legal Counsel, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 437, 
449 (1993) (noting that the President “has the authority . . . to make his own legal determinations 
without consulting any particular lawyer”). 
 92.  See Abraham D. Sofaer, The Reagan and Bush Administrations—Abraham D. Sofaer (1985–
1990), in SHAPING FOREIGN POLICY IN TIMES OF CRISIS: THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND 
THE STATE DEPARTMENT LEGAL ADVISER 65, 80–81 (Michael P. Scharf & Paul R. Williams eds., 
2010) (noting that the Iran-Contra affair “seriously damaged” the Administration’s antiterrorism 
program). 
 93.  See STAFF OF S. COMM. ON ARMED SERVICES, 110TH CONG., INQUIRY INTO THE 
TREATMENT OF DETAINEES IN U.S. CUSTODY 131 (Comm. Print 2008), available at 
http://armed-services.senate.gov/Publications/Detainee%20Report%20Final_April%2022%202009.pdf.  
Republican Senator Lindsey Graham of South Carolina, one of the legislators who subsequently 
investigated the evolution of the Administration’s policy on interrogation, observed that if group 
members did not see the work product, “I’m not so sure that’s much of a working group.”  Panel III of 
a Hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee: Origins of Aggressive Interrogation 
Techniques, 110th Cong., FED. NEWS SERVICE, June 17, 2008.  See generally MARGULIES, supra 
note 10, at 61 (discussing how bureaucratic allies of Vice President Cheney and his counsel David 
Addington, including William Haynes, general counsel at the Department of Defense, froze out 
potential critics). 
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of unilateral presidential power will always feel the urge to go it alone, but 
complicating the search for legal advice will intensify this trend.94 
III. SANCTIONING OLC LAWYERS: THE ALLURE AND UNINTENDED 
CONSEQUENCES OF POETIC JUSTICE 
To blunt impunity, some commentators have urged formal sanctions 
against former OLC lawyer John Yoo.95  Formal sanctions would send a 
strong message that such lawyering disserves the national interest.  
However, formal sanctions may violate principles of procedural justice and 
chill future decisions.96 
To examine the merits of formal sanctions, a quick look at Yoo’s work 
product is useful.  Yoo’s advice on coercive interrogation displayed 
problems of process and substance.  The advice emerged from a closed 
process driven by Vice President Cheney and Cheney’s legal alter ego, 
David Addington, without public disclosure or wide discussion within the 
Executive Branch.97  Indeed, other attorneys were methodically cut out of 
the process.98  Moreover, Yoo’s legal conclusions were extraordinarily 
 
 94.  JAMES E. BAKER, IN THE COMMON DEFENSE: NATIONAL SECURITY LAW FOR PERILOUS 
TIMES 314 (2007) (“Lawyers are not always invited into the decision-making room” because of 
“concerns about secrecy, delay, and ‘lawyer creep’ . . . whereby one legal question becomes 
seventeen, requiring not one lawyer but forty-three to answer.”).  An effort to streamline decision-
making may account for the tendency in Republican Administrations to set up detours around career 
bureaucrats, whom senior officials regard as Democrats eager to derail Republican initiatives.  See 
FRIED, supra note 88, at 154–55 (discussing perceived intractability of “permanent government”); 
MARGULIES, supra note 10, at 10 (arguing that for Vice President Cheney, “dissenters within the 
bureaucracy were either displaying a craven ‘cover your behind’ attitude or engaging in stealthy 
ideological warfare”); SAVAGE, supra note 9, at 281–86 (discussing efforts in the first and second 
Bush Administrations to control bureaucracy); cf. Cassandra Burke Robertson, Beyond the Torture 
Memos: Perceptual Filters, Cultural Commitments, and Partisan Identity, 42 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L 
L. 389 (2009) (discussing links between accountability for excesses of previous regime and partisan 
interactions). 
 95.  See Nasser Hussain & Austin Sarat, Introduction: Responding to Government Lawlessness: 
What Does the Rule of Law Require?, in WHEN GOVERNMENTS BREAK THE LAW: THE RULE OF 
LAW AND THE PROSECUTION OF THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION 1, 19 (Austin Sarat & Nasser Hussain 
eds., 2010) (asserting that the diplomatic efforts by the Obama Administration may be unavailing 
“without some measure of accountability for crimes, particularly torture”); Finkelstein, supra note 
14. 
 96.  See infra pp. 824–26, 829–32. 
 97.  See BLUM & HEYMANN, supra note 8, at 56–57 (noting how Addington refused to make 
OLC opinions available to the NSA). 
 98.  See id. at 18–19; MARGULIES, supra note 10, at 61.  As a group, military lawyers sought to 
push back against this dynamic; perhaps they were aware of reciprocal risks that an unduly 
aggressive posture could pose for United States military personnel.  Civilian decision makers 
resented the military’s scruples.  Compare Michael L. Kramer & Michael N. Schmitt, Lawyers on 
Horseback? Thoughts on Judge Advocates and Civil-Military Relations, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1407 
(2008) (arguing for robust dialogue between military lawyers and civilian officials on issues such as 
procedural safeguards in military tribunals), and Gregory S. McNeal, Organizational Culture, 
Professional Ethics and Guantánamo, 42 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 125, 126–34 (2009) (praising a 
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aggressive.  For example, consider Yoo’s interpretation of the torture 
statute,99 which Congress passed to implement the United States’ obligations 
under the United Nations Convention Against Torture (CAT).100  Yoo 
interpreted the statute, which prohibits conduct “specifically intended” to 
inflict severe pain, as requiring proof that an interrogator had inflicted pain 
for its own sake, not for another purpose such as gaining information.101  
Yoo also used unrelated health care statutes102 to define “severe pain” as 
pain associated with organ failure and other critical health conditions.103  
Given this backdrop, harm that fell short of being life threatening was 
outside the torture statute’s scope.104  Justifying these narrow constructions, 
Yoo invoked the canon of constitutional avoidance.105  The torture statute 
would be unconstitutional, Yoo argued, if it failed to provide the President 
with latitude.106  Yoo’s approach clashed with interpretations that fit the 
remedial purpose of the statute and CAT.  Yoo’s strained arguments were a 
case study in lawyering for the short term and cost the United States dearly 
in global good will when they came to light almost two years later.107 
 
culture of resistance to political influence within the military), with Glenn Sulmasy & John Yoo, 
Challenges to Civilian Control of the Military: A Rational Choice Approach to the War on Terror, 
54 UCLA L. REV. 1815, 1820–23 (2007) (portraying military lawyers who opposed Bush 
Administration policies on detention and interrogation as entrenched members of bureaucracy). 
 99.  See 18 U.S.C. § 2340A (2006). 
 100.  See United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment, G.A. Res. 39/46, art. 2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/39/708 (Dec. 10, 1984) 
[hereinafter CAT]. 
 101.  See Bybee Memo, supra note 7, at 174–75. 
 102.  E.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1369 (2006) (allowing federal reimbursement only for hospital care 
provided to undocumented aliens with emergency medical conditions). 
 103.  Bybee Memo, supra note 7, at 176. 
 104.  Id. at 176–77. 
 105.  See id. at 202–04. 
 106.  See id.; cf. Trevor W. Morrison, Constitutional Avoidance in the Executive Branch, 106 
COLUM. L. REV. 1189, 1229–30 (2006) [hereinafter Morrison, Constitutional Avoidance] (critiquing 
Yoo’s view as encouraging Executive Branch self-dealing). 
 107.  See David Luban & Henry Shue, Mental Torture: A Critique of Erasures in U.S. Law, 100 
GEO. L.J. (forthcoming 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1797806 (arguing that the U.S. 
interpretation of “mental torture” is problematic under international law).  See generally Robert M. 
Chesney, National Security Fact Deference, 95 VA. L. REV. 1361, 1412–18 (2009) (discussing 
institutional barriers to sound decision-making within the Executive Branch).  The amount of useful 
information yielded by the techniques that Yoo authorized, such as waterboarding, continues to be 
the subject of debate.  See Philip Zelikow, A Dubious C.I.A. Shortcut, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 2009, at 
A27 (noting that a former State Department official and director of the 9/11 Commission, Philip 
Zelikow, suggested that intelligence reports derived from interrogations of alleged 9/11 mastermind 
Khalid Shaikh Mohamed and two others, using “enhanced” techniques, “were a critical part of the 
intelligence flow, but rarely—if ever—affected a ‘ticking bomb’ situation”). 
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A.  Ethical Sanctions as a Remedy for Overreaching 
Professional discipline seemed at first blush like an appropriate and 
even necessary remedy for the myopia that Yoo displayed.108  However, 
transforming Yoo from a resoundingly negative example into a subject of 
professional discipline requires more.  Professional discipline, such as 
disbarment, could trigger the problems of paralysis and polarization 
discussed above.109  Moreover, state sanctions like disbarment rest on 
observance of procedural rights, such as notice and a right to be heard, 
which Yoo did not relinquish through his blithe dismissal of the rights of 
others.  Impatience with those rights merely takes a page from Yoo’s 
book.110 
DOJ’s Final Report correctly noted problems with professional 
discipline that Yoo’s accusers have ignored.  First, two of the guides to 
professional conduct which Yoo allegedly violated were drafted after his 
conduct occurred;111 fairness precluded applying these norms to Yoo’s case.  
Second, Yoo’s conclusions were more tempered and the underlying law 
more ambiguous than Yoo’s accusers have acknowledged.112  Third, Yoo’s 
aggressive interpretive method echoed earlier advice in the canon of national 
security law, including Attorney General Jackson’s opinion authorizing the 
destroyer deal with Britain.113 
 
 108.  Indeed, while the Department of Justice (DOJ) ultimately decided against a referral to state 
ethics regulators, the DOJ Final Report criticized Yoo in terms rarely applied to lawyers for the 
federal government, acknowledging that Yoo’s “loyalty to his own ideology” had inspired advice 
embodying “extreme . . . views of executive power.”  DOJ Final Report, supra note 15, at 67.  
Integrating short- and long-term perspectives may be particularly important for the government 
lawyer, since any official seeking advice is in some sense an agent for the polity as a whole.  That 
integration is necessary, regardless of the identity of the client the lawyer is advising.  For analyses 
of what turns on identification of the government lawyer’s client, see Keith A. Petty, Professional 
Responsibility Compliance and National Security Attorneys: Adopting the Normative Framework of 
Ethical Legal Process 8–13 (June 30, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1632945 (arguing that identifying the precise client is often not central 
because of overarching themes in national security advice).  Cf. Steven K. Berenson, Public 
Lawyers, Private Values: Can, Should, and Will Government Lawyers Serve the Public Interest?, 41 
B.C. L. REV. 789 (2000) (arguing that government lawyers have a duty to serve the public interest); 
Nelson Lund, The President as Client and the Ethics of the President’s Lawyers, 61 L. & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 65, 66–67 (1998) (arguing that government lawyers lack the authority to second-guess their 
clients’ choices on grounds of morality or policy); Geoffrey P. Miller, Government Lawyers’ Ethics 
in a System of Checks and Balances, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1293, 1295–97 (1987) (same); Zacharias, 
supra note 6, at 338–48 (arguing that questions about the role of public interest in legal advice occur 
for attorneys in both private and public employment). 
 109.  See supra Part II.C–D. 
 110.  See JOHN YOO, WAR BY OTHER MEANS: AN INSIDER’S ACCOUNT OF THE WAR ON TERROR 
152–54 (2006) (asserting that according detainees due process rights, including the right to a lawyer 
and a hearing, would interfere with the government’s counterterrorism efforts). 
 111.  DOJ Final Report, supra note 15, at 15–16. 
 112.  See id. at 35–38. 
 113.  Id. at 19. 
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1.  Notice, Time, and the Legality of Sanctions 
Imposition of sanctions on Yoo would have dented a centerpiece of the 
rule of law: the proposition that individuals can only be punished for 
violating laws in effect at the time of their conduct.114  In Yoo’s case, 
understanding this problem of legality merely requires a nod at the calendar.  
The OPR report, recommending a referral to state ethics regulators, relied on 
two ethics guides for government lawyers.115  However, neither of those 
guides existed when Yoo issued the principal opinions that formed the basis 
for the referral recommendation.  The guides that did not exist included a 
memorandum from OLC on “best practices” from May 2005,116 almost three 
years after Yoo had submitted his memo, and a similar list of principles from 
former OLC lawyers announced in December 2004.117  Broadly speaking, 
each guide urged that lawyers for OLC disclose and discuss opposing 
arguments.118  This is a sound and sensible practice, anchored in the 
importance of careful deliberation.  However, to transform prudent practice 
into an enforceable norm, the guides would have had to have been available 
to Yoo at the time he finalized his advice. 
Moreover, Yoo had expressly modified an extreme position because of 
opposing arguments.  Yoo added a significant hedge to his conclusion that 
liability hinged on proof of intent to cause severe pain for its own sake.119  
At the urging of Michael Chertoff, who was then head of the Justice 
Department’s Criminal Division and would later become the Secretary of 
Homeland Security,120 Yoo warned that whatever the interrogator’s motive, 
a jury could infer intent from any technique that a reasonable person would 
view as causing severe pain.121  An overzealous interrogator might have 
pondered Yoo’s warning and still taken his chances.  However, imposing the 
burden of uncertainty at trial on the interrogator is precisely what critics of 
 
 114.  See United States v. Santos, 128 S. Ct. 2020, 2025 (2008). 
 115.  See OPR Report, supra note 15, at 21–24. 
 116.  See Memorandum from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., to 
Attorneys of the Office of Legal Counsel, Re: Best Practices for OLC Opinions (May 16, 2005). 
 117.  See Johnsen, supra note 4, at 1602–10 (reprinting principles). 
 118.  See id. at 1605 (“OLC’s analysis should disclose, and candidly and fairly address, the 
relevant range of legal sources and substantial arguments on all sides of the question.”). 
 119.  See Bybee Memo, supra note 7, at 174–75. 
 120.  See DOJ Final Report, supra note 15, at 66. 
 121.  See Bybee Memo, supra note 7, at 175 (noting that “as a matter of practice in the federal 
criminal justice system it is highly unlikely that a jury would acquit” when a reasonable person 
would view a given interrogation method as causing severe pain to a detainee). 
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the Bush Administration’s policy sought,122 and clearly does not provide the 
legal cover which critics rightly deplore. 
Imposing formal sanctions on Yoo despite this caveat would also 
present significant problems of notice.  The OPR Report, which 
recommended a referral to state ethics regulators, asserted that Yoo’s caveat 
was “insufficient.”123  However, OPR failed to articulate what additional 
caveats Yoo could have included.124  Indeed, in the course of a 260-page 
report, OPR did not even provide a verbatim account of Yoo’s warning.125  If 
fairness requires attending to facts, Yoo deserved a more methodical 
accounting. 
The vague and untested scope of binding authority compounds this 
fairness problem.  In recommending that Yoo be referred to state ethics 
regulators, OPR relied on American Bar Association Model Rule 2.1, which 
states that a lawyer “shall exercise independent professional judgment and 
render candid advice.”126  However, courts have viewed Rule 2.1 solely as a 
makeweight.  Regulators have interpreted this rule as a generic restatement 
of more specific norms, such as the rules against dishonesty127 and conflicts 
of interest.128  Cases citing the provision involve lawyers who swindled their 
own clients.129  None involve a lawyer like Yoo, whose ideological blinders 
 
 122.  See Elaine Scarry, Five Errors in the Reasoning of Alan Dershowitz, in TORTURE: A 
COLLECTION 281, 282 (Sanford Levinson ed., 2004) (rejecting blanket impunity and Dershowitz’s 
proposal for “torture warrants,” and arguing that in a case where the infliction of severe pain 
demonstrably averted a catastrophe, the interrogator “would have to rely on convincing a jury of 
peers that the context for the act was exceptional”); cf. Michael W. Lewis, A Dark Descent into 
Reality: Making the Case for an Objective Definition of Torture, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 77, 86–87 
(2010) (arguing that the “ticking time bomb” scenario is too rare to provide a basis for law or 
policy); Kim Lane Scheppele, Hypothetical Torture in the “War on Terrorism,” 1 J. NAT’L 
SECURITY L. & POL’Y 285 (2005) (same). 
 123.  OPR Report, supra note 15, at 175. 
 124.  Yoo also added a caveat to his analogy to federal health care statutes that define “severe 
pain” as equivalent to the pain an individual would suffer during “death, organ failure, or the 
permanent impairment of a significant body function.”  Bybee Memo, supra note 7, at 176 (noting 
that health care statutes “address a substantially different subject”). 
 125.  See generally OPR Report, supra note 15. 
 126.  See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 2.1 (2011); cf. Clark, supra note 6 (discussing 
the relevance of Rule 2.1); Steven Giballa, Saving the Law from the Office of Legal Counsel, 22 
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 845, 845 (2009) (arguing that “Rule 2.1 should be interpreted to prohibit 
OLC lawyers from providing legal opinions . . . that advocate for unorthodox interpretations of the 
law,” and that they should be required “to provide what they believe to be the best, rather than a 
merely plausible, view of the law”). 
 127.  See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4(c) (2011) (defining lawyer misconduct to 
include “dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation”). 
 128.  See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7(a)(2) (2011) (prohibiting conflict between an 
interest of the client and “a personal interest of the lawyer,” unless the lawyer reasonably believes 
she can provide competent representation and the client gives informed consent in writing). 
 129.  See, e.g., In re Coffey’s Case, 880 A.2d 403 (N.H. 2005) (describing a series of acts in 
which a lawyer bilked his client out of property); In re Harper, 571 S.E.2d 292, 293 (S.C. 2002) (a 
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drove over-identification with client wishes.  Admittedly, Rule 2.1 is a 
useful guideline, particularly in its encouragement of lawyer advice on 
“moral, economic, social and political factors.”130  However, targeting Yoo’s 
2002 advice with a fresh pivot from the rule’s precatory pedigree to a newly 
robust conception would engender serious notice concerns. 
The relevant substantive legal authority is also vague.  Critics of Yoo 
rightly point out that the techniques Yoo authorized surely constitute “cruel, 
inhuman, or degrading treatment” under international law.131 However, 
critics fail to acknowledge international law’s demarcation between harsh 
treatment, which states may use in an emergency, and torture, which is 
categorically prohibited.  In a case dealing with interrogation methods used 
by Britain to seek information about violent acts against civilians planned by 
the Irish Republican Army, the European Court of Human Rights held that 
techniques such as use of stress positions and sleep deprivation did not 
constitute torture.132  Israel’s High Court of Justice, while interposing strict 
regulation of similar methods, did not categorically rule out their use.133  
Customary international law is moving gradually toward a consensus that 
even cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment should be categorically 
prohibited; but this consensus is not complete.134  While the United Nations 
General Assembly favors this view,135 the pervasive politics of that body 
 
case in which a lawyer with a substantial interest in a company in which his client had invested 
heavily did not inform the client of the company’s financial difficulties). 
 130.  See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 2.1 (2011). 
 131.  See CAT, supra note 100, at pmbl. (noting the parties’ desire to aid “struggle against torture 
and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment”); cf. JEREMY WALDRON, TORTURE, TERROR, AND 
TRADE-OFFS: PHILOSOPHY FOR THE WHITE HOUSE 204–05 (2010) (arguing that the notice argument 
is not persuasive because even conduct short of torture would still entail deliberate imposition of 
suffering). 
 132.  Ireland v. United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1978). 
 133.  See HCJ 5100/94 Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Isr. v. Israel 53(4) PD 817 [1999], 
reprinted in 38 I.L.M. 1471 (1999). 
 134.  Article 16 of the Convention Against Torture requires that states shall “undertake to 
prevent” cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment, and imposes a number of duties on signatories to 
achieve this goal, including education of officials, monitoring of practices, investigation, and access 
to the courts.  See CAT, supra note 100, at 198.  However, the CAT does not bar exceptions to the 
rule against cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment, although it does so expressly in the case of 
torture.  Id. at 197. 
 135.  See, e.g., Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, G.A. 
Res. 64/153, U.N. Doc. A/RES/64/153 (Dec. 18, 2009); see also Jordan J. Paust, The Absolute 
Prohibition of Torture and Necessary and Appropriate Sanctions, 43 VAL. U. L. REV. 1535, 1535–
37 (2009) (discussing General Assembly resolutions in the course of asserting that prohibition of 
cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment is a jus cogens norm that allows no derogation or 
exception). 
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limit its usefulness as a guide to the state of the law.136  Recent case law 
perpetuates this uncertainty.137 
United States courts do not further the cause of clarity, since there are 
no decisions on the meaning of the torture statute.  Indeed, the statute has 
not produced a single prosecution of an American official.  Therefore, courts 
have had no occasion to interpret its terms.138  The Justice Department’s own 
guidelines require intentional or reckless violation of an “unambiguous” 
norm.139  Yoo’s advice did not rise to that level. 
 
 136.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 
102, rptr. n.2 (1986) (noting only that General Assembly Resolutions “in some circumstances 
contribute to the process of making customary law”); see also STEPHEN C. MCCAFFREY, 
UNDERSTANDING INTERNATIONAL LAW (2006), reprinted in HENKIN ET AL., supra note 33, at 194–
95 (noting that General Assembly resolutions “must be evaluated carefully” before taken as evidence 
of formation of customary international law); David S. Mitchell, The Prohibition of Rape in 
International Humanitarian Law as a Norm of Jus Cogens: Clarifying the Doctrine, 15 DUKE J. 
COMP. & INT’L L. 219, 256 (2005) (noting that General Assembly resolutions provide evidence 
regarding customary international law, but are not dispositive). 
 137.  In Gäfgen v. Germany, 2010 Eur. Ct. H.R. 759, the European Court of Human Rights 
declared that Article 3 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, which governs members of the European Union, categorically barred all forms of cruel, 
inhuman, and degrading treatment.  Id. ¶ 87.  However, litigants conceded that the European 
Convention’s categorical bar differed from the more equivocal guidance in the CAT.  Id. ¶ 86 
(argument of Redress Trust).  Moreover, the court declined to hold that the admission of evidence 
obtained through threats of harsh treatment rendered the trial unfair.  Id. ¶ 187.  To reach this result, 
the court resorted to one of criminal procedure’s most outcome-determinative doctrines, the 
harmless error rule.  Id.  Overall, the Gäfgen court’s approach was more pragmatic than categorical.  
Its implications for the evolution of customary international law on cruel, inhuman, and degrading 
treatment are mixed, at best. 
 138.  One federal decision on interrogation of a criminal defendant within the United States used 
the term “torture” to describe a practice much like waterboarding.  However, the court analyzed 
criminal procedure issues with no relevance to the torture statute.  See United States v. Lee, 744 F.2d 
1124, 1125 (5th Cir. 1984) (ruling that a sheriff’s deputy who claimed that his superior had ordered 
him to participate in violations of defendants’ civil rights was not entitled to a severance at the start 
of trial).  In the past, the United States had prosecuted both its own troops and Japanese soldiers for 
wantonly forcing large quantities of water into subjects’ lungs and stomachs.  Cf. Claire Finkelstein 
& Michael Lewis, Should Bush Administration Lawyers Be Prosecuted for Authorizing Torture?, 
158 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 205, 214 (2010); Evan Wallach, Drop by Drop: Forgetting the 
History of Water Torture in U.S. Courts, 45 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 468, 482–90 (2007).  In 
contrast, Yoo approved only the ingestion of small amounts of water within specific time limits.  See 
Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Att’y Gen., to John Rizzo, Acting Gen. Counsel of the 
Cent. Intelligence Agency, Interrogation of al Qaeda Operative 4 (Aug. 1, 2002), available at 
http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/olc/zubaydah.pdf.  Yoo was myopic in failing to realize that 
interrogators under pressure to get information would force subjects to ingest substantially more 
water than he had authorized, and disregard the time limits he had prescribed.  See MARGULIES, 
supra note 10, at 64–65. 
 139.  U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, ANALYTICAL 
FRAMEWORK 3 (2005), http://www.justice.gov/opr/framework.pdf.  Norman Spaulding argued 
recently that DOJ’s Final Report incorrectly viewed OPR’s guideline as tracking the “clearly 
established” law standard for officials’ qualified immunity in tort.  Spaulding, Independence and 
Experimentalism, supra note 17, at 442; cf. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (stating 
the legal standard for qualified immunity).  However, since courts have defined clearly established 
law as law that is free of material ambiguities, there is little difference between OPR’s requirement 
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Scholars can and should criticize Yoo’s myopia.  By the same token, the 
Obama Administration’s view that waterboarding constitutes torture is a 
welcome advance.140  However, neither apt condemnation of Yoo’s advice 
nor praise for the current Administration’s stance rebuts the procedural 
fairness arguments against formal sanctions. 
2.   Disciplining Yoo, Echoes of the Destroyer Deal, and the Danger of 
Paralysis 
Another difficulty with subjecting Yoo to discipline stems from the 
uncomfortable similarity at the level of interpretive method between Yoo’s 
work and previous opinions never overruled.141  The aggressive interpretive 
method used by Yoo, if not the substance of his work, tracked the approach 
of government lawyers from the Republic’s founding.  Moreover, it 
foreshadows interpretation by Obama Administration lawyers on drone 
attacks.142  Disciplining Yoo would chill all such legal work. 
Aggressive interpretation started, fittingly enough, with George 
Washington.  Washington’s Neutrality Proclamation unilaterally restricted 
interpretation of a treaty with France to avoid America’s entanglement in 
European wars.143  While Washington’s move to spare the new republic this 
risk was essential to the United States’ development, contemporaneous 
critics attacked its legal justification.144  Interpretation along these lines 
 
of an “unambiguous” norm and the qualified immunity standard.  To be sure, OPR could change its 
standard to make it more demanding.  However, fairness would require that such a change be 
prospective in operation. 
 140.  See Eric Lichtblau, Nominee Wants Some Detainees Tried in the U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 
2009, at A1 (reporting views of then-Attorney General-designate Eric Holder). 
 141.  See generally Morrison, Stare Decisis in OLC, supra note 1 (discussing the precedential 
status of OLC and Attorney General opinions). 
 142.  See Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep’t of State, Remarks at the Annual Meeting 
of the American Society of International Law: The Obama Administration and International Law 
(Mar. 25, 2010) [hereinafter Administration and International Law], available at 
http://www.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/139119.htm (defending the Administration’s position); 
infra notes 315–29 and accompanying text (arguing that overall context supported legal 
authorization for drone attacks).  But see Mary Ellen O’Connell, Unlawful Killing with Combat 
Drones: A Case Study of Pakistan, 2004–2009 (Notre Dame Law Sch., Legal Studies Research 
Paper No. 09-43, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1501144 (arguing that drone attacks 
coordinated by intelligence agents violate international law); Report of the Special Rapporteur on 
Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, Human Rights Council, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/14/24 
(May 20, 2010) [hereinafter Extrajudicial Summary], available at http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G10/ 135/03/PDF/G1013503.pdf?OpenElement (same). 
 143.  See STANLEY ELKINS & ERIC MCKITRICK, THE AGE OF FEDERALISM 338 (1993). 
 144.  See id. at 337–40; Flaherty, supra note 76, at 21, 29–39; cf. Curtis A. Bradley & Martin S. 
Flaherty, Executive Power Essentialism and Foreign Affairs, 102 MICH. L. REV. 545 (2004) (arguing 
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continued with Andrew Jackson’s successful campaign to abolish the Bank 
of the United States; Jackson’s lawyers interpreted presidential power in a 
sweeping fashion to rid the country of what Jackson perceived as a 
regressive tool of oligarchical wealth and privilege.145  Lincoln opted for a 
robust interpretation of presidential power when he suspended habeas corpus 
and issued the Emancipation Proclamation.146  Teddy Roosevelt protected 
federal land and used the threat of force abroad to accomplish foreign policy 
goals,147 while his cousin Franklin Roosevelt dispatched his cohort of 
brilliant legal minds to defend the New Deal against precedents that cast 
doubt on its constitutionality.148  Closer to the present day, John F. Kennedy 
interpreted the United Nations Charter aggressively to justify the tailored 
response of a naval blockade during the Cuban Missile Crisis,149 and 
President Clinton was even more aggressive in intervening to stop genocide 
in Kosovo.150 
In the extensive annals of aggressive interpretation, one episode 
warrants special mention: Robert Jackson’s authorization of the destroyer 
deal with Britain during World War II.  In authorizing the destroyer deal, 
Jackson relied on the avoidance canon, citing the constitutional basis of 
presidential power in narrowly construing the Neutrality Act’s bar on 
 
that the Neutrality Proclamation and other measures taken in the Founding Era did not reflect a 
plenary view of executive power). 
 145.  See Spaulding, Independence and Experimentalism, supra note 17, at 420–22 (suggesting 
that moves demanded by Jackson and implemented by his Attorney General, Roger Taney, of Dred 
Scott fame, such as unilaterally transferring federal deposits to state banks from the Bank of the 
United States, constituted aggrandizement of power that the Constitution assigned to Congress). 
 146.  See FARBER, supra note 85, at 156–57. 
 147.  See DOUGLAS BRINKLEY, THE WILDERNESS WARRIOR: THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND THE 
CRUSADE FOR AMERICA 14–20 (2009) (describing how Roosevelt declared wildlife reservations and 
refuges on federal property, asking only whether Congress had prohibited such action); EDMUND 
MORRIS, THEODORE REX 459–61 (2001) (discussing intervention in Cuba in 1906); ARTHUR M. 
SCHLESINGER, JR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY 89 (2004) (discussing Roosevelt’s management of 
foreign affairs issues such as the agreement to acquire the Panama Canal).  Tempering these 
unilateral proclivities, Roosevelt coupled his “stewardship theory” of the Presidency with outreach 
to hitherto excluded constituencies, such as labor.  See Stephen Skowronek, The Conservative 
Insurgency and Presidential Power: A Developmental Perspective on the Unitary Executive, 122 
HARV. L. REV. 2070, 2084 (2009). 
 148.  See Spaulding, Independence and Experimentalism, supra note 17, at 423–29. 
 149.  Louis Henkin, Comment, in ABRAM CHAYES, THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS: INTERNATIONAL 
CRISES AND THE ROLE OF LAW 149, 152–53 (1974) (approving of a blockade as a measured use of 
force appropriate to the situation, while acknowledging tensions with limits on self-defense in U.N. 
Charter, art. 2(4)). 
 150.  See David R. Andrews, The Clinton Administration—David R. Andrews (1997–2000), in 
SHAPING FOREIGN POLICY IN TIMES OF CRISIS: THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE STATE 
DEPARTMENT LEGAL ADVISER 113, 125 (Michael P. Scharf & Paul R. Williams eds., 2010) (The 
State Department Legal Adviser found that because of a combination of compelling humanitarian 
need and questionable legal authority, intervention by NATO forces was “justifiable and legitimate, 
but not a precedent.”). 
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conveyance of material to other nations.151  Jackson also grafted an 
artificially narrow specific intent requirement onto the 1917 Espionage 
Act,152 which prohibited the intentional transfer to a belligerent power of 
“any vessel built, armed, or equipped as a vessel of war.”153  The most 
natural interpretation of the text is that Congress wanted to bar the 
intentional transfer of any vessel that matched the description.  However, 
Jackson parsed the provision differently, to bar only the transfer of vessels 
originally “built, armed, or equipped” with the specific intent to effect such a 
transfer.154  This strained interpretation allowed Jackson to opine that 
allowing Britain post hoc to borrow destroyers initially built for American 
use was legal.155  Undergirding the entire opinion was Jackson’s argument 
that the President could have proceeded if necessary on his own 
constitutional authority.156 
Jackson’s opinion sported the same aggressive interpretive style as 
Yoo’s work more than sixty years later.  Jackson invoked the avoidance 
canon in a way that furthered executive designs.157  He defined specific 
intent with a parched parsimony that conveniently excluded the President’s 
transaction with Britain.  To close the deal, he piled on a healthy helping of 
inherent executive power.158  To be sure, there were significant differences 
 
 151.  See Jackson op., supra note 29, at 494–96; cf. JACKSON, supra note 29, at 93–103; William 
R. Casto, Attorney General Robert Jackson’s Brief Encounter with the Notion of Preclusive 
Presidential Power, 30 PACE L. REV. 364, 368–80 (2010) (analyzing opinion). 
 152.  Espionage Act of 1917, ch. 30, 40 Stat. 217 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18, 
22, and 50 U.S.C.). 
 153.  Jackson op., supra note 29, at 494 (emphasis added). 
 154.  Id. 
 155.  See id.  Jackson cited a treatise which dealt with acts of a citizen or “subject” of a state, and 
did not address actions taken by the government itself, as in the destroyer deal.  See id.  The 
Attorney General acknowledged that his distinction between new and old destroyers was 
“hairsplitting.”  Id. (citing 2 OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 574–76 (5th ed. 1935)). 
 156.  Id. at 486.  Jackson cited the favorite decision of executive power’s champions, United 
States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319–20 (1936).  Jackson op., supra note 29, at 
486.  Quoting Justice Sutherland’s opinion in that case, he described the President as the “sole organ 
of the Federal Government in the field of international relations.”  Id. (quoting Curtiss-Wright, 299 
U.S. at 320).  Jackson failed to note that John Marshall, the source of the “sole organ” description, 
had qualified it in a fashion material to the destroyer deal, by noting that the President’s authority 
was paramount only in the absence of congressional action.  See Statement of John Marshall, 10 
ANNALS OF CONG. 613–14 (1800); cf. STEPHEN DYCUS ET AL., NATIONAL SECURITY LAW 66 (4th 
ed. 2006) (explaining context for Marshall’s remarks); H. Jefferson Powell, The Founders and the 
President’s Authority Over Foreign Affairs, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1471, 1511–27 (1999) (same). 
 157.  See Morrison, Constitutional Avoidance, supra note 106. 
 158.  Others share this view of Jackson’s opinion as markedly aggressive.  See DOJ Final Report, 
supra note 15, at 18–19 (quoting Jack Goldsmith, a Harvard law professor who as head of OLC in 
2003–2004 withdrew a number of Yoo’s memos, as calling Jackson’s analysis “extremely weak 
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in the process leading up to and following Jackson’s opinion, which was 
public and ratified by Congress in the Lend Lease Act.159  However, these 
differences coexisted with a common strand of aggressive interpretation.  
Given the unpredictability of events, the United States might need someone 
to advise a future President as Jackson advised Roosevelt.160  Criticizing 
Yoo does not imperil this prospect;161 but sanctioning Yoo could 
compromise a lawyer’s willingness to assume Jackson’s role. 
B.  Damage Actions and Hindsight Bias 
Concerns about procedural justice and paralysis would also doom a 
Bivens lawsuit for damages162 as a method of accountability.  Plaintiffs face 
multiple obstacles in such lawsuits, including persuading the courts to 
recognize such a remedy absent congressional authorization,163 and dealing 
with official immunities that thwart relief.164  Each problem is formidable for 
plaintiffs hoping to prevail in a lawsuit against OLC lawyers. 
 
[and] unconvincing,” “very bad,” and downright “terrible”).  However, Goldsmith’s remarks, cast 
with a tinge of irony to juxtapose Jackson’s interpretive method with Yoo’s, dovetailed with a high 
regard for Jackson’s place in the national security canon.  See id. at 19 (“Any standard that would 
have landed Robert Jackson in trouble cannot be the right standard.”). 
 159.  See David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb—A 
Constitutional History, 121 HARV. L. REV. 941, 1047 (2008). 
 160.  See SCHLESINGER, supra note 147, at 108 (describing the destroyer deal as “compelled by a 
threat to the nation surpassed only by the emergency which led Lincoln to take his actions after 
Sumter”). 
 161.  A consensus of elite opinion is a significant sanction for a professional like Yoo, who has 
become a negative example.  Cf. Vladeck, supra note 14, at 201–06 (discussing informal sanctions 
provided by public and elite opinion). 
 162.  See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 
(1971). 
 163.  Cf. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009) (precluding a lawsuit against senior officials by 
aliens detained and deported after the September 11 attacks); Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559, 580 
(2d Cir. 2009) (en banc) (precluding a lawsuit by an alleged survivor of extraordinary rendition); 
Brown, supra note 14, at 234–37 (discussing tort suits against officials as legitimate vehicles for 
accountability, but cautioning about negative externalities of such litigation); Peter Margulies, 
Judging Myopia in Hindsight: Bivens Actions, National Security Decisions, and the Rule of Law, 96 
IOWA L. REV. 195 (2010) [hereinafter Margulies, Judging Myopia in Hindsight] (arguing that courts 
should avoid categorical preclusion or intervention, and instead consider whether damages actions 
would further development of effective alternatives to overreaching); Alexander A. Reinert, 
Measuring the Success of Bivens Litigation and its Consequences for the Individual Liability Model, 
62 STAN. L. REV. 809 (2010) (arguing that damages litigation is an important safeguard for 
accountability). 
 164.  See Ashcroft v. Al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2085 (2011) (holding that official immunity 
protected a former Attorney General sued by an individual who had been detained as a material 
witness in a terrorism case); Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (stating the legal 
standard for qualified immunity); cf. Diana Hassel, Excessive Reasonableness, 43 IND. L. REV. 117 
(2009) (arguing that the current structure of adjudication for constitutional torts encourages undue 
deference to official decisions); Stephen I. Vladeck, AEDPA, Saucier, and the Stronger Case for 
Rights-First Constitutional Adjudication, 32 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 595, 608–12 (2009) (same). 
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In some cases involving national security, courts have declined to permit 
suits for damages, citing the chilling effect on officials and the risk of 
disclosing sensitive information as “factors counseling hesitation.”165  While 
there are strong arguments that precluding a lawsuit at this stage bends the 
law too far in the direction of impunity, courts in national security cases 
have often discounted this countervailing factor.166 
In addition, official immunity interposes a significant obstacle to 
recovery.  Officials have qualified immunity, which courts can breach only 
if an official acts in disregard of clearly settled law.167  Official immunities 
protect public servants from the unfairness of being surprised by legal 
developments that the officials could not have predicted.168  Viewed from an 
ex ante perspective, immunities allow officials to make difficult decisions 
without paralyzing worries about the effects of hindsight bias.169 
The lawsuit by former detainee Jose Padilla170 against Yoo is vulnerable 
on each of these counts.  While categorical preclusion of Bivens suits can 
send an unhealthy signal to officials and encourage official overreaching, an 
appeals court might view the need for secrecy in the provision of legal 
advice as justifying such a step.171  In any case, the Padilla suit will also 
flounder on the grounds of official immunity.  A district court found that the 
suit could go forward.172  However, the decision failed to adequately explain 
how Padilla overcame Yoo’s qualified immunity, in light of the court’s 
acknowledgement that “the legal framework relating to [Padilla’s 
detention] . . . was developing at the time of the conduct alleged in the 
 
 165.  See Arar, 585 F.3d at 573, 576–77 (asserting that risk of disclosure of sensitive national 
security information was a factor weighing against the availability of a damages claim). 
 166.  Compare id. at 636 (Calabresi, J., dissenting) (expressing concern that the majority’s 
conclusion would make Bivens actions inappropriate in every case), with id. at 576–77 (majority 
opinion) (discussing risk of disclosure of sensitive national security information without 
acknowledging the dissent’s concerns). 
 167.  See Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231. 
 168.  See id. at 245. 
 169.  On hindsight bias, see Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory of Judging in 
Hindsight, in BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS 95, 95 (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000) (noting that 
maxims such as “hindsight . . . is ‘20/20’” stand for the proposition that “[l]learning how the story 
ends . . . [distorts] our perception of what could have been predicted”). 
 170.  Padilla was subsequently convicted on terrorism charges; his case is on appeal.  See Abby 
Goodnough & Scott Shane, Padilla is Guilty on All Charges in Terror Trial, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17, 
2007, at A1. 
 171.  See Lebron v. Rumsfeld, 764 F. Supp. 2d 787, 790–807 (D.S.C. 2011) (dismissing the 
lawsuit brought by Padilla and his mother against the former Secretary of Defense regarding the 
same treatment that forms the basis for the lawsuit against Yoo). 
 172.  Padilla v. Yoo, 633 F. Supp. 2d 1005, 1039–40 (N.D. Cal. 2009). 
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complaint.”173  The combination of questions about the availability of a 
cause of action and the scope of immunity dims the prospects for a lawsuit 
against Yoo.174 
IV. STRUCTURAL REMEDIES: A CURE WORSE THAN THE DISEASE? 
Those impatient with a quixotic reliance on formal sanctions have 
proposed structural changes that would make OLC more independent and 
judicial in character.175  The most sweeping change comes from Bruce 
Ackerman, who has proposed a “Supreme Executive Tribunal.”176  Others, 
including Neal Katyal, have offered more modest versions of this 
adjudicative turn.177  Norman Spaulding has proposed removal restrictions 
for supervisors at OLC, with the goal of making OLC more independent.178  
Unfortunately, these proposals will only expand the risks of reform.  In 
addition, some of the structural proposals undermine the separation of 
powers. 
A.   Courting Disaster: Transforming OLC into a Judicial Entity 
Ackerman’s makeover of American government would create a new 
tribunal with nine members sitting for staggered twelve-year terms.179  In 
advancing his proposal, however, Ackerman failed to specify the role of 
standing and other threshold issues.180  This lack of specificity creates more 
questions than answers about the tribunal’s role. 
The confusion may have stemmed from Ackerman’s unclear depiction 
of standing in comparative law.  On the one hand, Ackerman acknowledged 
that a German tribunal that helped inspire his proposal had a jurisdictional 
mandate that would clash with Article III constraints on standing.181  As a 
result, Ackerman noted, the German tribunal could not serve as a model for 
 
 173.  See id. at 1036–37 (emphasis added).  For an incisive critique of the failure of the Yoo court 
to follow the applicable legal standard or acknowledge the policy rationale for qualified immunity, 
see Peter H. Schuck, Immunity, Not Impunity, AM. LAWYER, Nov. 2009, at 51. 
 174.  See Vladeck, supra note 14, at 204–05 (concluding that the lawsuit has a low probability of 
success). 
 175.  See Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers, supra note 17, at 2336–40; cf. Pillard, supra note 
4, at 748–58 (discussing other structural reforms in OLC, including a greater role for the Justice 
Department’s Office of the Inspector General); Posner & Vermeule, The Credible Executive, supra 
note 17, at 896–909 (criticizing Katyal’s proposals as promoting rigidity). 
 176.  See ACKERMAN, supra note 6, at 143–50. 
 177.  See Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers, supra note 17. 
 178.  See Spaulding, Independence and Experimentalism, supra note 17, at 433–37. 
 179.  See ACKERMAN, supra note 6, at 143. 
 180.  Id. at 146–47 (noting that the proposal requires “legal fine tuning”); see also id. at 246–47 
n.6 (discussing standing). 
 181.  Id. at 246–47 n.6. 
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his Supreme Executive Tribunal.182  However, Ackerman also stated that the 
French Conseil d’Etat was a more promising template for his approach.183  
Yet the Conseil d’Etat issues advisory opinions.184  Borrowing from 
institutions elsewhere is often valuable, but one should first be sure what 
attributes those institutions possess. 
The Tribunal’s interaction with conceptions of standing in the federal 
courts is even more unclear.  Ackerman would permit suits by members of 
Congress, whom the Supreme Court has typically held lack standing to 
sue.185  The Tribunal would also hear cases that federal courts would decline 
to hear because they raise political questions.186  Courts stay their hand in 
these matters to allow Congress and the President to work out their 
differences on policy matters.187  Many of these matters may lack clear 
standards that facilitate judicial review or may address contexts such as 
foreign policy, where the nation should speak with one voice.188  Thus, under 
Ackerman’s prescription, a primary source of the Tribunal’s workload 
would be decisions about pending statutes or regulations contested by 
legislators on policy grounds. 
This prescription is worse than the disease.189  Legislators would have 
far less reason to negotiate with either the President or their own 
colleagues.190  Instead of engaging in the messy business of negotiation, they 
would seek the Tribunal’s intervention.191  To perform its advisory function, 
 
 182.  Id. 
 183.  Id. 
 184.  Predictably, the decisions of the Conseil d’Etat clash with the decisions of the other two high 
tribunals in France.  See David S. Law, A Theory of Judicial Power and Judicial Review, 97 GEO. 
L.J. 723, 775 n.165 (2009). 
 185.  See ACKERMAN, supra note 6, at 145; cf. Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 813, 830 (1997) 
(holding that members of Congress lacked standing to challenge provisions of a statute authorizing 
line-item veto). 
 186.  ACKERMAN, supra note 6, at 145–46. 
 187.  See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). 
 188.  See id. at 211–13 (noting that “many such questions uniquely demand a single-voiced 
statement of the Government’s views”); cf. RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., IMPLEMENTING THE 
CONSTITUTION 45–55 (2001) (discussing institutional concerns such as manageable standards that 
influence the role of doctrine in particular cases); Rachel E. Barkow, More Supreme Than Court? 
The Fall of the Political Question Doctrine and the Rise of Judicial Supremacy, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 
237 (2002) (recommending greater recourse to doctrine). 
 189.  See Trevor W. Morrison, Constitutional Alarmism, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1688, 1742–48 
(2011) (book review) [hereinafter Morrison, Constitutional Alarmism]. 
 190.  See id. at 1744. 
 191.  See id. 
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the Tribunal would have to stay pending legislation for weeks or months.192  
This delay would have a particularly deleterious impact on foreign policy 
matters, where a timely move may be necessary to avert irreparable harm or 
capitalize on a fleeting opportunity.193  Moreover, such temporal shifts 
would inevitably alter the political dynamic, giving opponents of legislation 
an advantage.  Leverage of this kind might be useful for groups traditionally 
disfavored in the political process; however, equal protection and other 
doctrines already protect these groups.194  Ackerman designed his proposal 
not for remedying discrimination, but for recalibrating an allocation of 
powers among the branches that, in his view, had tilted dangerously toward 
the Executive.195 
While the Executive Branch would be weaker once Ackerman’s 
Tribunal opened for business, it is far less clear that Congress as an 
institution would be stronger.  The most likely winner would be inertia, as 
small groups of legislators representing special interests would seek recourse 
in the Tribunal to block rules or statutes that benefited the public as a whole.  
The Tribunal might also overshoot the mark on presidential power.  Instead 
of merely curbing overreaching, the Tribunal might provide timid presidents 
with political cover for passivity.196 
In short order, the Tribunal might find its own institutional capital 
running low.  For courts, standing doctrine not only observes Article III 
limits on judicial power, but also ensures a concreteness that sharpens 
issues.197  By relaxing standing requirements and allowing advisory opinions 
on pending legislation, the Tribunal might have to rewrite its own decisions 
 
 192.  See id.  Ackerman subsequently asserted that his proposal still “grant[ed] the President the 
power to have the last say,” regardless of the Tribunal’s decision.  Ackerman, supra note 17, at 39.  
However, the passages from The Decline and Fall of the American Republic that Ackerman cited in 
his reply to Morrison did not make this clear, but only ventured the prediction that if the President 
“is determined to pursue his course, he must defy the [T]ribunal.”  Id. (citing ACKERMAN, supra note 
6, at 150).  Describing the President as “defy[ing]” the Tribunal sounds like an extra-legal action, not 
an exercise of lawful prerogative. 
 193.  For example, delay could have complicated the Louisiana Purchase.  See Youngstown Sheet 
& Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579, 638 n.5 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) (citing 
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Breckinridge (Aug. 12, 1803), in 10 THE WRITINGS OF 
THOMAS JEFFERSON 407, 411 (Andrew A. Lipscomb & Albert Ellery Bergh eds., 1903)) (discussing 
the need for decisive action). 
 194.  See Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973) (invalidating a provision that 
excluded “hippie communes” from the Food Stamp program); cf. FALLON, supra note 188, at 87–89 
(discussing rationale for judicial review). 
 195.  ACKERMAN, supra note 6, at 143 (noting that the point is to “create a new institutional 
mechanism that will put a brake on the presidential dynamic before it can gather steam”). 
 196.  This is also a risk of the present system.  See Power of the President in Executing the Laws, 
9 Op. Att’y Gen. 516, 523 (1860) (opinion by President Buchanan’s Attorney General, J.S. Black, 
finding that the President lacked power to prevent secession). 
 197.  See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962) (applying the standing doctrine); cf. Matthew I. 
Hall, The Partially Prudential Doctrine of Mootness, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 562 (2009) (discussing 
interplay of constitutional and prudential rationales in threshold doctrines). 
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every few weeks as political coalitions shift.  As a result, both the legal 
community and the public might quickly come to see the Tribunal as a pawn 
in the political process, rather than a source of enduring norms.  These 
consequences of relaxed standing rules also reduce the utility of Neal 
Katyal’s earlier, more modest suggestion for an adjudicative turn at OLC.198 
An adjudicative model like Katyal’s could also increase polarization.  
Katyal proposed sending some interagency disputes to a Director of 
Adjudication, whose mandate might also include assessing the effect of 
international law on presidential power.199  However, hitching the President 
to the wagon of the Director of Adjudication’s advice would have significant 
unintended consequences.  If the President perceives the Tribunal’s 
procedures as too cumbersome to fit the nation’s needs, the legitimacy of the 
Tribunal itself may suffer.200  In regulated industries, compliance suffers 
when businesses view regulation as out of touch with realities “on the 
ground.”201  This sense of illegitimacy of the Tribunal can polarize the 
situation, spurring the President to even riskier strategies.  Polarization is 
even more likely because the President is not locked into advice from a new 
tribunal.  The President can always secure advice elsewhere, such as from 
the White House Counsel.202  This exit strategy would make legal advice 
even less independent.203 
 
 198.  See Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers, supra note 17; cf. Margulies, True Believers, 
supra note 6, at 64 (arguing that “concretely adversarial relationships” sharpen issues and therefore 
improve decision makers’ work products). 
 199.  See Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers, supra note 17, at 2337–40.  Katyal highlighted 
the possibility that the proposed Director of Adjudication could have issued an opinion on the 
applicability of the Geneva Conventions to Guantanamo detainees.  Id. at 2340 (noting that an 
opinion by a “neutral adjudicator” would have strengthened the case for judicial deference to the 
President). 
 200.  OLC has already adopted some procedures that insulate it from political pressure, in the 
manner of a court, at the price of “isolating it from its clients and the contexts in which they 
operate.”  Morrison, Stare Decisis in OLC, supra note 1, at 1509; see also Pillard, supra note 4, at 
734–38 (citing a preference for written requests and an aversion to opining on hypothetical 
questions). 
 201.  See, e.g., Neil Gunningham & Darren Sinclair, Regulation and the Role of Trust: Reflections 
from the Mining Industry, 36 J.L. & SOC’Y 167, 176–83 (2009) (noting the ineffectiveness of legal 
sanctions); Robert A. Kagan, Dorothy Thornton & Neil Gunningham, Explaining Corporate 
Environmental Performance: How Does Regulation Matter?, 37 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 51, 73–74 
(2003) (same); cf. Tom Tyler, Stephen Schulhofer & Aziz Z. Huq, Legitimacy and Deterrence 
Effects in Counterterrorism Policing: A Study of Muslim Americans, 44 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 365 
(2010) (discussing the positive effects of perception of legitimacy on cooperation with law 
enforcement). 
 202.  See Pillard, supra note 4, at 713.  But see Morrison, Constitutional Alarmism, supra note 
189 (arguing that White House Counsel also has a tradition of integrity which will minimize abuses).  
Katyal acknowledged this risk.  See Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers, supra note 17, at 2339 
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These concerns dovetail with even more pressing constitutional cavils 
about restrictions on removal of the Tribunal’s members.204  To ensure the 
advice giver’s independence, Ackerman and others have proposed 
restrictions on the President’s removal power.205  The Supreme Court has 
recently indicated that the separation of powers places limits on Congress’s 
ability to create positions within the Executive Branch, whose occupants the 
President cannot remove.206  Removal restrictions, including requiring good 
cause, are clearly permissible only when the official has responsibility for 
 
(“The traditional case against OLC independence is that it leads to less advice rather than more.”).  
To deal with this issue, Katyal proposed allowing agencies and whistleblowers to file cases with the 
new adjudicative entity.  Id.  This proliferation of intra-branch litigants might well promote greater 
reflection about governance issues.  However, it could also produce an intra-branch version of 
Ackerman’s tribunal, in which contending players will too readily seek relief in adjudication instead 
of ironing out their differences through negotiation.  Katyal’s inter-agency tribunal could also 
become a pawn in turf disputes, revising its decisions as agency parties negotiate.  Of course, parties 
negotiate conventional court cases all the time.  However, courts have threshold tests like standing 
rules, ripeness, and exhaustion to ensure that parties do not prematurely exit other avenues for 
resolving their disputes.  See, e.g., Morrison, Stare Decisis in OLC, supra note 1. 
 203.  The unique prestige of OLC reduces this cost.  See MaryAnne Borrelli et al., The White 
House 2001 Project: The White House Interview Program, Report No. 29, at 12 (Nov. 1, 2000), 
http://whitehousetransitionproject.org/files/counsel/Counsel-OD.PDF (oral history project on White 
House Counsel’s office quoting C. Boyden Gray, White House Counsel under the first President 
Bush, as commenting, “[w]e [the White House] were free to ignore their advice but you knew so you 
did so at your peril because if you got into trouble you wouldn’t have them there backing you up, 
you wouldn’t have the institution backing you up”). 
 204.  In France, members of the political branches, including the Prime Minister and Minister of 
Justice, participate in the Conseil d’Etat.  See Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Providing Judicial Review for 
Decisions by Political Trustees, 15 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 1, 44 (2005).  However, scholars 
accept that American elected officials or cabinet members could not serve in this capacity, at least if 
the tribunal had any distinctive adjudicative function.  See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2 (forbidding 
members of Congress from holding executive office); see also Akhil Reed Amar & Vikram David 
Amar, Is the Presidential Succession Law Constitutional?, 48 STAN. L. REV. 113, 119 n.38 (1995) 
(noting that the Constitution does not expressly forbid an executive official from holding judicial 
office, but that thinkers from Madison forward have believed that a prohibition is implied).  The 
President could, of course, participate in a more informal intra-branch review of executive policies.  
However, that more informal process would lack the independence that Ackerman considered to be 
vital. 
 205.  See ACKERMAN, supra note 6, at 147–49; cf. Spaulding, Independence and Experimentalism, 
supra note 17, at 433–37.  But see Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers, supra note 17, at 2237–38 
(conceding that the Constitution could require allowing the President to overrule the Director of 
Adjudication). 
 206.  See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3151–52 
(2010) (invalidating removal restrictions on members of the Public Company Accounting Oversight 
Board (PCAOB) within the Securities and Exchange Commission).  However, the Free Enterprise 
Fund holding is relatively narrow, and does not alter the pragmatic view of Congress’s power as 
outlined in the case law.  See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 671 (1988) (upholding an 
independent counsel statute which granted courts the authority to appoint counsel and limited the 
President’s removal power); Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 632 (1935) 
(upholding a statute requiring good cause for removal of the Chair of the Federal Trade 
Commission).  For a more expansive view of presidential power, see Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin 
H. Rhodes, The Structural Constitution: Unitary Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. REV. 
1153 (1992). 
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overseeing administrative adjudication authorized by Congress, or has been 
appointed for a limited purpose not involving compliance with the 
President’s instructions.207  In those situations, restrictions on removal are 
necessary to ensure the integrity of the adjudicative process.  However, the 
adjudication that Congress can protect only entails regulation of private 
sector dealings, such as the Securities and Exchange Commission’s 
jurisdiction over publicly traded companies.208  No precedent exists for 
creation of a tribunal within the executive branch that would exert binding 
power over the President’s decisions.209  An Article III court has such 
power,210 but Ackerman’s proposal was a response to perceived 
inadequacies with federal court review.  The unanswered questions about 
Ackerman’s proposal have taken us back to where we started. 
Similar problems affect Spaulding’s proposal to preserve OLC’s current 
structure, but add restrictions on removal.211  This proposal would also give 
the President political cover for inertia, and therefore insulate him from 
voters who expect the President to deliver what he promised.212  While 
Spaulding argued that the secrecy of OLC’s advice on national security 
justified this additional freedom from presidential control, courts have 
typically viewed secrecy as facilitating the President’s discharge of purely 
executive responsibilities.213  Spaulding was surely correct that secrecy can 
become a serious problem in OLC’s work.214  However, the fallout from 
excessive secrecy will not justify otherwise unconstitutional restrictions on 
the removal power. 
 
 207.  See Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3152 (noting that the earlier case concerned the Federal 
Trade Commission, an independent agency that was “quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial,” rather 
than “purely executive” in character (citing Humphrey’s Ex’r, 295 U.S. at 627–29)). 
 208.  Congress can also authorize courts to exercise its prerogatives under Article I of the 
Constitution.  Bankruptcy courts are one example.  Commentators have proposed specialized Article 
I courts for immigration and Social Security disability benefits.  See, e.g., Stephen H. Legomsky, 
Restructuring Immigration Adjudication, 59 DUKE L.J. 1635, 1678–79 (2010) (discussing the virtues 
and risks of such a proposal in an immigration context).  However, Congress has never created an 
Article I court that purported to define the President’s duties, as Ackerman’s Tribunal would do.  See 
Morrison, Constitutional Alarmism, supra note 189, at 1745. 
 209.  See Morrison, Constitutional Alarmism, supra note 189, at 1745. 
 210.  See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579 (1952). 
 211.  See Spaulding, Independence and Experimentalism, supra note 17, at 433–37. 
 212.  See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 163–64 (1926) (finding that the President has the 
sole power to remove purely executive officers). 
 213.  See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319–20 (1936). 
 214.  BLUM & HEYMANN, supra note 8, at 18–19. 
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B.   Doubling Down on Bureaucracy: The New Professional Misconduct 
Review Unit 
The changes described above, particularly Ackerman’s makeover, are 
likely to remain bases for discussion, rather than implementation.  Whatever 
the merits of these proposals, they at least respond to a felt concern about 
past abuses.  The one structural change actually promulgated by the new 
Administration—the creation of the Professional Misconduct Review Unit 
(PMRU)—is unlikely to stop abuses in the future. 
The PMRU, established by Attorney General Eric Holder, will review 
OPR findings that Justice Department lawyers have engaged in 
misconduct.215  However, this measure may not promote accountability.  
First, it will not review no-cause determinations by OPR, but only instances 
where OPR has recommended discipline.216  Second, the new unit will 
further delay the review process by requiring more layers of bureaucracy, 
thereby frustrating the public interest in timely review and disclosure.217  
While the process needs fixing, the PMRU may compound problems, rather 
than alleviate them. 
V.   DECISIONAL REFORMS: SUBSTANTIVE STANDARDS AND DELIBERATIVE 
PROCESSES 
Reformers have also suggested changes in the substantive standard 
governing OLC’s work, and the role it performs.  The impetus for these 
suggestions comes from a general consensus that Yoo wrongly approached 
his job as would a private lawyer advocating in court for his client’s 
position.218  In the advocacy context, ethics rules promote a robustly 
adversarial debate, by prohibiting only knowing misstatements of fact or 
law.219  OLC’s work requires more; however, discerning how much more to 
require has proven challenging.  Some believe that utter objectivity is 
essential.220  Other scholars generally accept an objective standard, but 
 
 215.  See Press Release, Office of Pub. Affairs, Dep’t of Justice, Attorney General Creates 
Professional Misconduct Review Unit, Appoints Kevin Ohlson Chief (Jan. 18, 2011) [hereinafter 
Press Release], available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/January/11-ag-060.html.  Most 
complaints about DOJ lawyers involve criminal prosecutions.  See, e.g., United States v. Stevens, 
715 F. Supp. 2d 1, 2–5 (D.D.C. 2009) (discussing allegations of abuses, including failure to disclose 
exculpatory evidence, in the prosecution of late Alaska senator Ted Stevens). 
 216.  See generally Press Release, supra note 215. 
 217.  See Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, The Duty to Avoid Wrongful Convictions: A 
Thought Experiment in the Regulation of Prosecutors, 89 B.U. L. REV. 1, 16 n.75 (2009). 
 218.  See GOLDSMITH, supra note 4, at 149 (quoting another government lawyer as describing 
Yoo’s work as reading “like a bad defense counsel’s brief, not an OLC opinion”); LUBAN, supra 
note 6, at 198 (describing Yoo’s memos as “aggressive advocacy briefs”). 
 219.  See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a)(1)–(2) (2011). 
 220.  See infra notes 223–26 and accompanying text. 
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hedge their bets either by allowing more aggressive opinions when the 
lawyer discloses opposing arguments or by permitting a more senior official 
such as the President to act against the lawyer’s advice.221  Still others 
believe that OLC advice does not resemble a private lawyer’s work or a 
judicial decision—instead, “[i]t is something inevitably, and uncomfortably, 
in between,” with some, but not unlimited, room for minding the President’s 
institutional and policy interests. 222 
A.  The Perils of Absolutism 
Ackerman emphatically belongs in the objectivity camp—he proposed a 
Supreme Executive Tribunal to replace OLC because he believed that 
anything less than judicial objectivity was a danger to the country.223  
Another commentator adopted the same view by declaring that OLC should 
provide advice that “fairly addresses and objectively evaluates” the law.224  
Proponents of an objective standard acknowledge that law sometimes can be 
ambiguous.225  However, according to this view, the OLC lawyer should not 
consider the President’s political or institutional interest in assessing what 
the law allows.226 
The absolutist view is compelling, until it confronts the situation on the 
ground.  Consider the exigent circumstances that persuaded Robert Jackson 
to authorize World War II’s destroyer deal with Britain.227  An absolutist 
could question the need for the transaction, though historians have largely 
resolved that issue, finding that our refusal would have facilitated 
Germany’s defeat of Britain and permitted the Axis powers to pivot toward 
attacking the United States.228  A more committed absolutist could reason 
that the peril to the country should not figure in her calculations, either 
because such danger cannot outweigh contravention of positive law in any 
case or because exceptions will eventually cause greater harm to the legal 
 
 221.  See infra notes 235–37 and accompanying text. 
 222.  See GOLDSMITH, supra note 4, at 35. 
 223.  See ACKERMAN, supra note 6, at 143–50 (proposing Tribunal); id. at 104 (denouncing 
anything less than this standard as “twists and turns of legalese”). 
 224.  See John C. Dehn, Institutional Advocacy, Constitutional Obligations, and Professional 
Responsibilities: Arguments for Government Lawyering Without Glasses, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 
SIDEBAR 73, 79 (2010). 
 225.  Id. at 78. 
 226.  Id. (stating that OLC lawyers should not shade advice to defend an “‘institutional tradition,’ 
prerogative, or policy decision”). 
 227.  See SCHLESINGER, supra note 147, at 105–06 (noting that the United States faced a “genuine 
national emergency”). 
 228.  See id. at 108. 
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fabric.  Here, too, however, the historians would whittle down absolutist 
arguments, suggesting that only the Civil War surpassed the seriousness of 
the situation facing Jackson and his principal, Franklin Roosevelt.229  In 
other words, the historians tell us, without the action proposed there might 
be no rule of law left to praise.230  After the historians are done, the 
absolutist can only insist that even a clear and present danger to the nation 
will not justify a relaxed view of the lawyer’s role.  That stance merits a 
certain grudging admiration, but cannot bind a leader whose first duty is to 
the country’s survival.231 
Because the absolutist approach is ultimately unpalatable, some 
commentators have sought to couple an objective standard with a hedge that 
mitigates the standard’s rigidity.  Professors Blum and Heymann, for 
example, argued that OLC should only provide “mainstream,” not merely 
“remotely plausible” or “idiosyncratic” views of the law.232  However, they 
suggested that OLC’s limited role should not bind the President, who can act 
to safeguard the country.233  While this position offers more flexibility, it 
ignores the link between the lawyer’s opinion and the President’s ability to 
act.  On the destroyer deal, for example, Roosevelt was unwilling to move 
without some guarantee of congressional acquiescence, and a major 
legislative ally had said that legal justification was necessary.234  While that 
may not always be the case, a commentator supporting this hedge should at 
 
 229.  Id. 
 230.  This was Lincoln’s argument to Congress about the need to suspend habeas corpus in 
Maryland.  See Abraham Lincoln, Message to Congress in Special Session (July 4, 1861), in 4 THE 
COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 421, 430 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953) (asserting that 
preserving habeas would have allowed “all the laws, but one, to go unexecuted . . . [and] go to 
pieces”); cf. SCHLESINGER, supra note 147, at 59 (discussing Lincoln’s exercise of power); Barron & 
Lederman, supra note 159, at 998–1000 (arguing that Lincoln’s actions were provisional in nature, 
and did not rely on a plenary view of presidential power). 
 231.  See BLUM & HEYMANN, supra note 8, at 10; see also Michael Walzer, Political Action: The 
Problem of Dirty Hands, in TORTURE: A COLLECTION 61, 63–67 (Sanford Levinson ed., 2004) 
(discussing Machiavelli and Weber); Wendel, supra note 5, at 86–87 (discussing Walzer’s view of 
leaders as “reluctant realists”); cf. Max Weber, Politics as a Vocation, in FROM MAX WEBER: 
ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 77, 127 (H.H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills eds. & trans., 1946) (discussing 
leaders’ ultimate responsibilities).  But see Kim Lane Scheppele, Law in a Time of Emergency: 
States of Exception and the Temptations of 9/11, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1001 (2004) (arguing that 
emergency measures create their own momentum).  See generally Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 
1, 37 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (asserting that the Constitution is not a “suicide pact”). 
 232.  See BLUM & HEYMANN, supra note 8, at 54–55. 
 233.  Id. at 55; cf. id. at 10 (noting this standard). 
 234.  See SCHLESINGER, supra note 147, at 106–07.  Admittedly, this is not always the case.  
Jefferson completed the Louisiana Purchase despite his Attorney General’s opposition.  See John O. 
McGinnis, Models of the Opinion Function of the Attorney General: A Normative, Descriptive, and 
Historical Prolegomenon, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 375, 414–17 (1993); cf. Blum, supra note 21, at 281 
(arguing that the Executive must assume responsibility for doing what is right even if his lawyers 
disagree).  See generally Gross, supra note 21, at 1106–07. 
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least consider the endogeneity of the lawyer’s opinion to the President’s 
decision. 
Other scholars hedge by coupling an objective standard with a 
dispensation for lawyers who disclose opposing arguments.235  However, this 
approach either constrains too little or simply reverts back to the absolutist 
standard.  It constrains too little because surely some opinions are 
unjustifiable, even if the lawyer diligently lists opposing arguments.  
Consider an opinion endorsing genocide.  Presumably, even a champion of 
the opposing argument hedge would view such an opinion as unacceptable 
no matter how comprehensively the genocide lawyer recited arguments in 
opposition.  In fact, proponents of this hedge might be tempted to deny that 
the genocide lawyer even made opposing arguments, or find the lawyer’s 
canvassing of genocide critiques inadequate.  Yoo, as we have seen, 
provided caveats for his arguments about specific intent and severe pain.236  
Neither caveat saved Yoo’s opinion from myopia, but a scholar whose 
approval hinges on opposing arguments should at least mention them.237  A 
scholar who fails to do so has reverted back to the absolutist posture, with all 
of the problems linked to that stance. 
Other scholars—those with experience at OLC—give an answer that 
Ackerman deplored but which is still the best start for an honest look at the 
“uncomfortably . . . in between” role of OLC.238  For Morrison, OLC should 
give “its” best view, which inevitably will consider the President’s 
interests.239  This view is the most honest, and also the one that best matches 
the long history of OLC and Attorney General opinions.240 
 
 235.  See LUBAN, supra note 6, at 198; Johnsen, supra note 4, at 1605; Wendel, supra note 5, at 
120. 
 236.  See Bybee Memo, supra note 7, at 175. 
 237.  Wendel and Luban, who highlighted the importance of opposing arguments, did not mention 
Yoo’s caveats.  See LUBAN, supra note 6; Wendel, supra note 5; cf. David Luban, Liberalism, 
Torture, and the Ticking Bomb, 91 VA. L. REV. 1425, 1452–57 (2005) (omitting mention of Yoo’s 
disclaimers in a lengthy discussion). 
 238.  See GOLDSMITH, supra note 4, at 35. 
 239.  See Morrison, Stare Decisis in OLC, supra note 1, at 1502 (stating that OLC should offer 
“its best view of the law, which is different from the job of an advocate but also need not carry the 
pretense of ‘true’ neutrality”); cf. Johnsen, supra note 4.  But see ACKERMAN, supra note 6, at 104 
(critiquing OLC veterans’ views as apologia for executive power). 
 240.  See Moss, supra note 4.  It may benefit from more specific content, which I offer later in this 
Article.  See infra Part VI. 
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B.  Deliberative Virtues: Of Stare Decisis, Disclosure, and Dissenting 
Views 
Scholars who have turned their attention to a substantive standard have 
also considered OLC’s deliberative process.  After all, how one makes a 
decision is often as important as the underlying substantive standard.  
Political theorists have long asserted that deliberative habits are crucial to a 
polity’s political development.241  In the OLC context, efforts along these 
lines have focused on three areas: disclosure, the presence of dissenting 
views, and stare decisis. 
1.  Disclosure 
Disclosure is an important deliberative safeguard.  From an ex ante 
perspective, disclosure protects against fringe views, since the author of an 
opinion knows that outside audiences will “kick the tires” and quickly 
discover and critique views that distort the relevant law.242  Disclosure also 
helps ex post, by allowing Congress, professional peers, and the public to see 
distortions as they emerge and campaign to correct them.243  Disclosure also 
works hand in hand with efforts by the President to secure ratification of an 
unorthodox view that responds to exigent circumstances; disclosure, at least 
to Congress, is a necessary incident of ratification.244  Certain opinions may 
contain sensitive information that makes immediate disclosure 
inappropriate.245  However, Congress could well require as part of its 
oversight that OLC engage in a deliberative process, including making 
express findings that become part of an opinion, when such circumstances 
prevail. 
 
 241.  See Frank Michelman, Law’s Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493 (1988); Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond 
the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539 (1988). 
 242.  See Margulies, True Believers, supra note 6, at 79–80; Morrison, Stare Decisis in OLC, 
supra note 1, at 1518–20; Setty, supra note 22 (discussing the importance of the disclosure of legal 
policy positions).  See generally David E. Pozen, Deep Secrecy, 62 STAN. L. REV. 257 (2010) 
(discussing the uses and dangers of government secrecy). 
 243.  See Setty, supra note 22, at 602–05 (discussing the benefits of disclosure to generate 
political and public sentiments). 
 244.  See Margulies, True Believers, supra note 6, at 66–68 (noting the need for transparency, 
even in exigent circumstances, to facilitate dialogue between the branches of government). 
 245.  See Setty, supra note 22, at 610 (discussing the treatment of sensitive information in 
balancing the President’s need to act quickly and Congress’s need for information). 
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2.  Considering Opposing Views 
Scholars and veterans of OLC also argue that the office should expressly 
consider opposing views.246  Testing views against opposing arguments is a 
time-honored approach to deliberation, although it should not shield lawyers 
who advise a course that violates clearly established law.247  Seeking input 
from government lawyers with opposing views is also a sound practice.248  
Without that input, the government can make colossal blunders, as recent 
Administrations have shown.249  Moreover, consideration of opposing views 
should entail a reasoned statement of those views, including an explanation 
of their foundation.250  Yoo’s warning that a jury would consider specific 
intent in light of reasonable inferences about the effect of interrogation 
practices was a significant step in the right direction, albeit not a complete 
response.251  In contrast, his more fleeting caveat about the limited relevance 
of Medicaid statutes to the concept of pain in the torture statute only 
gestured at the level of deliberation expected.252 
3. Stare Decisis 
Scholars with experience at OLC have also commended the office’s 
respect for precedent as an aid to deliberation.253  Respect for precedent 
encourages deliberation, since in the process of discovering and 
distinguishing precedent the lawyer will be obliged to grapple with different 
views and explore similarities and differences with her own.  At its best, 
such an approach could also lead to the kind of habits of reflection that 
courts at their best display—an effort to find workable approaches that will 
stand the test of time.  However, developing a workable approach to 
precedent at OLC also requires acknowledging the complexities of the task.  
Difficult issues include flaws in the analogy between OLC and courts, and 
 
 246.  See LUBAN, supra note 6, at 198; Johnsen, supra note 4, at 1605; Wendel, supra note 5, at 
85. 
 247.  See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d) (2011) (noting that it is unethical for a 
lawyer to knowingly advise a client to violate the law). 
 248.  See Morrison, Stare Decisis in OLC, supra note 1, at 1522; Spaulding, Independence and 
Experimentalism, supra note 17, at 438–39. 
 249.  See Sofaer, supra note 92, at 81–82. 
 250.  See LUBAN, supra note 6, at 198. 
 251.  See Bybee Memo, supra note 7, at 174–75. 
 252.  See id. at 176–77. 
 253.  See GOLDSMITH, supra note 4, at 145–46; Morrison, Stare Decisis in OLC, supra note 1, at 
1492–1504.  See generally Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REV. 571 (1987) (discussing 
meanings and usage). 
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uncertainty about the nature of precedent, its effects, and criteria for 
overruling prior decisions. 
As the critique of Ackerman’s Supreme Executive Tribunal proposal in 
the previous Part showed, OLC as currently constituted bears only limited 
resemblance to courts.254  Stare decisis works because courts handle scores 
or hundreds of cases with similar facts.255  However, OLC does not resolve a 
comparable volume of disputes.  Compared to most courts, OLC considers 
more one-off questions that have high stakes, but little prospect for 
recurrence in exactly the same form.256  In this sparser decisional 
environment, stare decisis is not as useful.257  As a case in point, consider 
Bybee’s analysis of the torture statute.258  Apparently, OLC had never done 
such an analysis before, so concrete OLC precedent was unavailable.259 
The common law roots of stare decisis may also be an inapposite model 
in other respects.  Common law decision making has limitations.260  Stare 
 
 254.  See supra Part IV.A. 
 255.  See Lauren Vicki Stark, The Unworkable Unworkability Test, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1665, 1668 
(2005) (noting the need for precedents to reduce the workload of judges). 
 256.  See Memorandum from David J. Barron, Acting Assistant Att’y Gen., to Att’ys of the Office 
of Legal Counsel, Re: Best Practices for OLC Legal Advice and Written Opinions 1 (July 16, 2010) 
[hereinafter Barron Memo], available at http://www.justice.gov/olc/pdf/olc-legal-advice-
opinions.pdf (noting that OLC is “frequently asked to opine on issues of first impression”).  As one 
ascends the appellate ladder, courts entertain a higher ratio of cases of first impression.  The 
Supreme Court obviously hears a large percentage of such cases.  In cases in which precedent exists, 
however, the Court generally accords it significant weight.  Instances of overruling often provoke 
sharp disagreement among the Justices regarding the existence of narrower grounds for the decision.  
Compare Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 917–25 (2010) (Roberts, C.J., concurring) 
(arguing that comprehensive overruling of precedent was necessary in a campaign finance case), 
with id. at 929–79 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority, which struck down federal 
campaign finance provisions, should have decided the case on narrower grounds or respected 
precedent by upholding the statute). 
 257.  Morrison’s discussion of his data set of OLC opinions noted that the vast majority are 
“neutral,” which he defined as either not mentioning OLC precedent or citing all such precedent 
favorably.  See Morrison, Stare Decisis in OLC, supra note 1, at 1480–81 (noting that the “neutral” 
category included 88.16% of OLC opinions).  Morrison did not break down this “neutral” category 
into opinions that did and did not cite precedent.  He also did not attempt the admittedly difficult 
task of quantifying the level of generality of the OLC opinions cited, to discern if some of those 
cited were essentially boilerplate, like many cites to Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 
(1803), in judicial opinions.  Without these more laborious and fine-grained calculations, it is 
difficult to assess exactly how precedent shapes OLC’s overall work product.  Of course, some 
issues do recur.  See Morrison, Stare Decisis in OLC, supra note 1, at 1472–73 (noting that 
nineteenth century Attorneys General had followed precedent that Spanish claimants seeking 
damages from government arising out of conflict in Florida were not entitled to interest).  But see id. 
at 1474 n.106 (noting that, in 1862, Lincoln’s Attorney General, Edward Bates, declined to follow an 
earlier opinion concluding that free blacks were not citizens and therefore were not eligible for 
command of American seafaring vessels). 
 258.  See Bybee Memo, supra note 7. 
 259.  See generally id. at 200 (noting that “[t]he situation in which these issues arise is 
unprecedented”). 
 260.  ADRIAN VERMEULE, LAW AND THE LIMITS OF REASON 108–09 (2009) (noting that common 
law systems can be “inefficient” when “the rate of environmental change is high”). 
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decisis is path dependent, so that a precedent established at one point in time 
will govern others to follow.261  However, that puts a special onus on the 
variables, many of them randomly generated, contributing to the initial 
decision.262  While the decision maker at this juncture seeks to anticipate 
future implications of her ruling, her clairvoyance will of necessity be 
incomplete.263 
As a result, the degree of actual constraint imposed by precedent on a 
current president becomes a hit-or-miss affair.  OLC precedent will constrain 
a president who might wish to defy a statute he regards as 
unconstitutional.264  This position, which seems unexceptionable in 
principle, may raise problems for future presidents regarding statutes that no 
longer fit evolving conceptions of human and civil rights.265  Consider, for 
example, the “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” (DADT) policy that for a number of 
years limited the eligibility of openly gay individuals to serve in the 
military.266  President Obama was right both to seek DADT’s repeal and to 
modify enforcement of the provision in the run up to the repeal effort.267  
However, OLC’s precedent on compliance with unconstitutional statutes 
may have deterred a president of less fortitude and ingenuity from limiting 
enforcement of the provision. 
In other situations, available precedent from OLC on perennial issues 
like presidential power may not adequately constrain the President.  Judicial 
precedent, such as Youngstown,268 gives the President ample wiggle room—
for example, by leaving up in the air whether the President can act when 
 
 261.  Id. (discussing path dependence in common law). 
 262.  Cf. id.; Oona A. Hathaway, Path Dependence in the Law: The Course and Pattern of Legal 
Change in a Common Law System, 86 IOWA L. REV. 601, 606–22 (2001) (also discussing path 
dependence in common law). 
 263.  See Hathaway, supra note 262, at 629 (addressing the limitations of judges considering 
future cases). 
 264.  See Presidential Authority to Decline to Execute Unconstitutional Statutes, 18 Op. O.L.C. 
199 (1994), reprinted in H. JEFFERSON POWELL, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE ATTORNEYS 
GENERAL 577, 578 (1999) (arguing that the President has the obligation to execute statutes that the 
Supreme Court is likely to uphold). 
 265.  See Dawn E. Johnsen, What’s a President to Do? Interpreting the Constitution in the Wake 
of Bush Administration Abuses, 88 B.U. L. REV. 395, 410–19 (2008) (addressing the President’s 
“nonenforcement” authority). 
 266.  10 U.S.C. § 654 (1993) (repealed 2010). 
 267.  See Craig Whitlock, Pentagon Prepares to Relax ‘Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,’ WASH. POST, Mar. 
25, 2010, at A4 (discussing possible changes to enforcement, including refusal to act on anonymous 
complaints). 
 268.  Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579 (1952). 
DO NOT DELETE 4/20/2012  1:25 PM 
 
848 
Congress is silent.269  The lines between statutory expression, implication, 
and silence are notoriously blurred.270  This uncertain boundary leaves OLC 
plenty of room to massage a particular situation into one that justifies the 
exercise of presidential discretion. 
Further complications ensue because the unpredictability of situations 
facing the executive and the constitutional status of presidential authority 
require some means of overruling OLC precedent.  The criteria and 
occasions for overruling call for great care, however, if OLC is to avoid the 
perception of strategic behavior.271  As Morrison recently acknowledged, a 
provision for overruling based on the constitutional views of the President is 
required as a legal matter; as a unit within a cabinet department, OLC could 
not bind itself to a decisional rule in defiance of the President’s 
instructions.272  Moreover, the exception is required for reasons of policy: 
exigent circumstances may arise that make rigid adherence to decisional 
rules inadvisable.273  However, exceptions complicate the analysis in two 
ways.  First, if exceptions are possible, stare decisis becomes less effective 
as a guide to future advice.274  Lawyers providing advice know ex ante, as do 
their clients within the executive branch, that if stare decisis becomes too 
confining, the President can alter the advice’s outcome.275  That encourages 
both lawyers and their clients below the chief executive level to push the 
envelope of precedent to avoid presidential overruling.276  Sometimes the 
lawyers may push too far.277  Of course, courts do this too.  However, courts 
are virtually always public; they must submit their decisions for scrutiny by 
the public, the media, and professional elites, who will point out particularly 
 
 269.  See Patricia L. Bellia, Executive Power in Youngstown’s Shadows, 19 CONST. COMMENT. 
87, 147–49 (2002) (arguing that avoiding precise delineation of the President’s inherent power is 
unhealthy for democratic deliberation); Edward T. Swaine, The Political Economy of Youngstown, 
83 S. CAL. L. REV. 263 (2010) (discussing uncertainty in the Steel Seizure test). 
 270.  See Peter Margulies, Judging Terror in the “Zone of Twilight”: Exigency, Institutional 
Equity, and Procedure After September 11, 84 B.U. L. REV. 383 (2004). 
 271.  See Morrison, Stare Decisis in OLC, supra note 1, at 1504–18 (citing Planned Parenthood of 
Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854–55 (1992) (noting the factors for overruling, including 
workability, hardship, and obsolescence)). 
 272.  However, as Morrison notes, OLC cannot simply surrender its duty to provide legal advice.  
See id. at 1512 (citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 511–512 (2006), statutory authority for the Attorney General’s 
provision of advice to the President). 
 273.  See supra Part V.A. 
 274.  See Stark, supra note 255, at 1674 (noting that, in the judicial context, overruling precedent 
undermines the legitimacy of the Court). 
 275.  See Morrison, Stare Decisis in OLC, supra note 1, at 1517–18. 
 276.  See id. 
 277.  See id. at 1517.  This dynamic may be less salient because the President may view 
overruling as a serious step that signals legal jeopardy.  See Borrelli et al., supra note 203; Morrison, 
Constitutional Alarmism, supra note 189. 
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strained arguments.278  That acts as accountability of a sort.  In contrast, 
while disclosure is a valued incident to OLC advice, the President can 
choose not to disclose.279  So OLC as a practical matter has fewer constraints 
in the way that it interprets the bond imposed by stare decisis in a particular 
case. 
Despite these caveats, the regime of stare decisis articulated above also 
clarifies a matter that has continued to provoke debate: the status of 
decisions by presidents like Jefferson, Lincoln, and Roosevelt to move 
beyond the textual limits of their authority.280  Some have argued that these 
decisions were extralegal.281  Their legitimacy depended on subsequent 
ratification, and they presumably had no precedential value.282  Hamilton, in 
contrast, believed that in exigent situations the President had such power 
under the Constitution.283  The truth (appropriate enough for OLC) is 
somewhere in between.  Presidential decisions of this type do depend on 
subsequent ratification for their legitimacy; however, ratification does confer 
on such decisions a limited precedential value.  Willingness to treat such 
historical examples as relevant precedent encourages analytical use of these 
episodes, rather than slipshod or expedient invocation.  To be sure, OLC 
lawyers should handle these examples with care, because they emerged from 
the cauldron of extraordinary events, and because their citation as precedent 
will also signal a comparable testing of the limits of presidential power.284  
For the latter reason, presidents will seldom deem it prudent to cite these 
examples from history, and that is as it should be. 
 
 278.  See generally Todd E. Freed, Is Stare Decisis Still the Lighthouse Beacon of Supreme Court 
Jurisprudence?: A Critical Analysis, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 1767 (1996) (commenting on the Court’s 
differing treatment of stare decisis). 
 279.  Few, if any, reformers suggest that all OLC advice should be disclosed immediately upon its 
issuance.  See Morrison, Stare Decisis in OLC, supra note 1, at 1482–83 (acknowledging the general 
importance of confidentiality).  But see id. at 1518–19 (arguing that presidential overruling should be 
disclosed). 
 280.  See BLUM & HEYMANN, supra note 8, at 10–11. 
 281.  See id. at 11–12 (summarizing arguments against these decisions). 
 282.  See id. at 11 (discussing debate); Gross, supra note 21. 
 283.  BLUM & HEYMANN, supra note 8, at 11; cf. Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Constitution of 
Necessity, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1257 (2004) (arguing for broad executive power). 
 284.  Jackson, for example, cited Jefferson in his destroyer deal opinion.  See Jackson op., supra 
note 29, at 487–88 (asserting that the transaction with Britain “falls far short in magnitude of the 
acquisition by President Jefferson of the Louisiana Territory”).  During the Reagan Administration, 
then-Assistant Attorney General Ted Olson cited Jackson’s opinion in finding that aid to the 
Nicaraguan contras did not violate the Neutrality Act.  See Overview of the Neutrality Act, 8 Op. 
O.L.C. 209, 216–17 (1984). 
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VI.   DIALOGIC EQUIPOISE AND OLC 
Ultimately, OLC is not so much a quasi-judicial as a constitutionalist 
body that imposes constraints on the executive in the shorter term for the 
sake of longer term gains.  Majorities consent to constitutional protections 
because they know that a protection that frustrates them today may 
safeguard their rights tomorrow.285  Similarly, presidents value OLC because 
it gives them more room to maneuver once its concerns are satisfied, even 
though satisfying its concerns can be challenging in the near term.  The 
sustainability of the institution requires a kind of dialogic equipoise.286 
The OLC lawyer must always consider how other stakeholders, 
including Congress and the courts, will view executive initiatives.  Just as 
lawyers often leverage their own reputation to build up goodwill for their 
clients,287 the OLC lawyer’s pedigree of deliberation gives her advice special 
clout.  An OLC lawyer who too readily buys into the President’s initiatives 
will cannibalize her own credibility, and eventually leave the President 
without the imprimatur that OLC can provide.288  In that way, an ideological 
affinity between an OLC lawyer and the President is like the siren song that 
distracted Ulysses289 from his journey home: it tempts executive officials 
with the promise of short-term benefits while holding long-term perils.290  
As the metaphor suggests, accepting OLC’s advice is a Ulysses contract, 
which binds the principal to the mast to ensure the journey’s successful 
conclusion.  On the other hand, if OLC becomes an unduly cumbersome 
institution, the costs of seeking its imprimatur outnumber the benefits.291  
The virtues of this coordinated game for the President decline.  At that point, 
the President will deem it most efficient to exit and seek advice from another 
quarter, and again OLC will lose its ability to influence policy.292  OLC 
should cultivate a sense of balance, avoiding opinions that unduly constrict 
or expand executive power. 
 
 285.  See Jack Goldsmith & Daryl Levinson, Law for States: International Law, Constitutional 
Law, Public Law, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1791, 1826–28, 1835 (2009) (discussing the premises of 
constitutionalism). 
 286.  See Margulies, True Believers, supra note 6, at 66–71. 
 287.  See Ronald J. Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset Pricing, 
94 YALE L.J. 239, 263–67 (1984). 
 288.  See Morrison, Stare Decisis in OLC, supra note 1, at 1513. 
 289.  See JON ELSTER, ULYSSES AND THE SIRENS: STUDIES IN RATIONALITY AND IRRATIONALITY 
(1984); Cass R. Sunstein, Legal Interference with Private Preferences, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 1129, 
1140 (1986). 
 290.  OLC’s memos in the year and a half after September 11 offered policymakers temporary 
peace of mind, while undermining their chances for subsequent buy-in from the other branches.  See 
GOLDSMITH, supra note 4, at 206–07. 
 291.  See Morrison, Stare Decisis in OLC, supra note 1, at 1511–18 (highlighting the need for 
OLC to balance adherence to its precedent with the President’s authority to abrogate that precedent). 
 292.  See id. 
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A.  Combining Substance and Deliberation 
To pursue this elusive goal, a dialogic equipoise approach articulates a 
substantive test for acting in crises, but then uses the deliberative device of a 
cap to limit such expansive use of presidential power.  In this way, it uses 
OLC’s unique standing when circumstances require, but also maintains that 
standing through a precommitment mechanism that curbs overreaching.  
This hybrid strategy helps keep OLC safe from the polar extremes of undue 
risk aversion and risk-prone decisions.293 
The substantive test has three requirements.  First, action that pushes the 
envelope must have a compelling sovereignty- or human rights-centered 
rationale, defined respectively as the avoidance of irreparable harm to the 
nation or the promotion of emerging norms of liberty or equality.  Second, 
the action taken must have a reasonable chance of ratification.  Third, the 
action cannot violate any other constitutional norms.294 
Sovereignty-centered actions would include measures, such as the 
Louisiana Purchase, which vastly increased the nation’s size and resulted 
from fleeting circumstances abroad that made the only alternative—passage 
of a constitutional amendment—impracticable.295  This category would also 
include Lincoln’s suspension of habeas corpus in Maryland in April 1861 to 
prevent the separation of the nation’s capital from the rest of the Union.296  
Roosevelt’s destroyer deal with Britain during World War II297 and 
Kennedy’s imposition of a blockade during the Cuban Missile Crisis298 also 
meet this high standard.  In each case, substantial controversy attended the 
decision at the time.  However, historians now generally agree that each 
measure served the national interest.299 
 
 293.  See supra Part II. 
 294.  These would include provisions found in the Bill of Rights or the Equal Protection Clause.  
The criteria in the text distill presidential decisions, often supported by legal advice, that have 
pushed the envelope in a fashion that history has judged kindly.  See SCHLESINGER, supra note 147, 
at 89, 109. 
 295.  See Gross, supra note 21, at 1106–08. 
 296.  Demonstrating the urgency of the crisis, in April 1861, Confederate sympathizers in 
Maryland targeted Union troops and burned railroad bridges from Baltimore to the North.  See 
JAMES F. SIMON, LINCOLN AND CHIEF JUSTICE TANEY: SLAVERY, SECESSION, AND THE 
PRESIDENT’S WAR POWERS 184–85 (2006). 
 297.  See JACKSON, supra note 29, at 93–103. 
 298.  Peter Margulies, When to Push the Envelope: Legal Ethics, the Rule of Law, and National 
Security Strategy, 30 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 642, 671 (2007). 
 299.  The largest remaining historical controversy concerns Lincoln’s suspension of habeas 
corpus, although even with regard to that episode, historians fault the suspension’s temporal and 
geographic expansion, not the relatively tailored measure in Maryland in the spring of 1861.  See 
MARK E. NEELY, JR., THE FATE OF LIBERTY: ABRAHAM LINCOLN AND CIVIL LIBERTIES (1991). 
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Human rights-centered moves would include Lincoln’s Emancipation 
Proclamation,300  President Clinton’s participation in NATO’s intervention 
to stop genocide in Kosovo,301 and President George H.W. Bush’s 
participation in a United Nations humanitarian mission in Somalia.302  
Lincoln defended this aspect of presidential action most effectively, viewing 
emancipation not merely as a military measure, but also as “an act of 
justice” consistent with the “considerate judgment of mankind.”303  The 
United States is strongest when it acts decisively to prevent humanitarian 
catastrophes because the credibility thus acquired can also bolster diplomatic 
efforts in the future.304  Congress’s ratification or acquiescence demonstrates 
that the President in such contexts often acts as an agent for both political 
branches. 
The Obama Administration’s decision to help stop the loss of life in 
Libya qualified on both humanitarian grounds and reasons related to the 
United States’ role in global institutions.305  Here, the slaughter of innocents 
would have been substantial without timely intervention.  The Security 
Council had authorized the move, and action without the United States 
would have undermined America’s commitment to the efficacy of 
international organizations.306  The interventions in Somalia and Kosovo 
provide precedent, making the decision to intervene consistent with stare 
decisis in the Executive Branch. 
The Libyan intervention also poses no violation of any other 
constitutional norms, which would bar any presidential action that violated 
provisions of the Bill of Rights or of the Equal Protection Clause.  This 
 
 300.  See Abraham Lincoln, Emancipation Proclamation (Jan. 1, 1863), in 6 THE COLLECTED 
WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 28 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953) [hereinafter Emancipation 
Proclamation]; cf. Sanford Levinson, The David C. Baum Memorial Lecture: Was the Emancipation 
Proclamation Constitutional? Do We/Should We Care What the Answer Is?, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 
1135, 1142–45 (discussing legal and historical context). 
 301.  See HENKIN ET AL., supra note 33, at 548–49. 
 302.  See Authority to Use United States Military Forces in Somalia, 16 Op. O.L.C. 6 (1992); 
Memorandum Opinion for the Attorney General, 16 Op. O.L.C. 8, 9–12 (1992) [hereinafter Somalia 
Memo]. 
 303.  See Emancipation Proclamation, supra note 300; cf. ERIC FONER, THE FIERY TRIAL: 
ABRAHAM LINCOLN AND AMERICAN SLAVERY 237 (2010) (quoting Lincoln’s December 1862 
message, describing emancipation as the “last best . . . hope of earth”). 
 304.  JOSEPH S. NYE, JR., THE PARADOX OF AMERICAN POWER: WHY THE WORLD’S ONLY 
SUPERPOWER CAN’T GO IT ALONE 35 (2002) (suggesting that actions reflecting world consensus 
will result in “important opportunities for cooperation in the solution of global problems such as 
terrorism”); Christopher J. Borgen, Hearts and Minds and Laws: Legal Compliance and Diplomatic 
Persuasion, 50 S. TEX. L. REV. 769, 774–78 (2009) (noting the significance of global credibility 
with both governing elites and citizenry of other nations). 
 305.  See Authority to Use Military Force in Libya, 35 Op. O.L.C. 1, 10 (2011); see also Charlie 
Savage, Attack Renews Debate Over Congressional Consent, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 2011, at A14 
(discussing initial reactions). 
 306.  This was also a rationale for President George H.W. Bush’s decision to intervene in 
Somalia.  See Somalia Memo, supra note 302, at 11. 
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prong would prohibit any unilateral executive effort to detain United States 
citizens without judicial review.  Because of this restriction, no President 
could unilaterally implement a program like the Japanese-American 
internment program during World War II.307 
The ratification requirement entails a reasonable expectation that 
Congress would either specifically endorse the President’s decision through 
an affirmative act or acquiesce in the decision, or a reasonable belief that 
Congress has already authorized the decision.  Both future legislative acts 
and acquiescence would require timely public disclosure, of the kind 
demonstrated by Lincoln regarding habeas corpus, Roosevelt in the 
destroyer deal, and Kennedy in the Cuban Missile Crisis.308  Roosevelt and 
Jackson, for example, engaged in a process of “extensive and vigilant 
consultation” with internal and external stakeholders. 309  That deft and 
patient process eventually led to Congress’s ratification of the destroyer deal 
in the Lend-Lease Act.310  The tailored nature of America’s Libya role and 
consultation with congressional leaders about the move311 would fulfill this 
criterion. 
 
 307.  See Patrick O. Gudridge, Remember Endo?, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1933 (2003) (discussing 
internment litigation).  Congress also could not require broad internment of citizens, given any 
sensible reading of the sum total of Supreme Court precedent, which would include Korematsu as a 
negative example, much like John Yoo’s lawyering.  Cf. Jack Goldsmith & Cass R. Sunstein, 
Military Tribunals and Legal Culture: What a Difference Sixty Years Makes, 19 CONST. COMMENT. 
261 (2002) (discussing changes in American constitutional culture since World War II).  Lincoln’s 
initial suspension of habeas received post hoc approval from the Supreme Court in dicta in Ex parte 
Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 125 (1866) (observing that “in a great crisis . . . exigency . . . [could 
permit suspension when] immediate public investigation according to law may not be possible; 
and . . . the peril to the country may be too imminent to suffer such persons to go at large”). 
 308.  See supra notes 294–98 and accompanying text. 
 309.  See SCHLESINGER, supra note 147, at 108. 
 310.  See GOLDSMITH, supra note 4, at 199–205. 
 311.  See Savage, supra note 305.  The legal status of the United States’ role in Libya after 
expiration of the War Powers Resolution’s sixty-day deadline for seeking congressional 
authorization presents more vexing questions.  See Charlie Savage, Libya Effort is Called Violation 
of War Act, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 2011, at A8.  The Administration argued that its role after 
expiration of the deadline was largely confined to supplying French and English forces, which it said 
did not rise to the level of “hostilities” under the War Powers Resolution.  See Trevor W. Morrison, 
Libya, “Hostilities,” the Office of Legal Counsel, and the Process of Executive Branch Legal 
Interpretation, 124 HARV. L. REV. F. 62, 62 (2011) [hereinafter Morrison, Libya Hostilities], 
available at http://www.harvardlawreview.org/ media/pdf/vol124_forum_morrison.pdf.  However, 
United States warplanes and drones also attacked Libyan positions during this current phase of the 
conflict.  Id.  Although Congress did not define “hostilities,” the use of lethal force would seem to 
qualify.  Moreover, the Administration did not push hard for congressional ratification of its 
position, although it said it would “welcome” congressional approval.  See Donna Cassata, Senate 
Panel Votes to Back US Actions in Libya that House Rebuked, BOS. GLOBE (June 29, 2011), 
http://articles.boston.com/2011-06-29/news/29718051_1_libya-senate-panel-war-powers-resolution.  
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In contrast, the low likelihood of ratification would preclude advice like 
John Yoo’s about interrogation tactics.312  Moreover, coercive questioning of 
suspected terrorists will rarely avoid irreparable harm, since traditional 
methods of interrogation such as building rapport are plausible alternatives 
to the tactics that Yoo authorized.313  Even in cases where alternatives have 
been unavailing, the government should discount the harm that coercive 
questioning could conceivably prevent by the harm that such questioning 
inflicts on the integrity and discipline of government institutions.314 
B.  A Case Study: The Obama Administration and Drone Attacks in 
Pakistan 
To see dialogic equipoise in action, consider the Obama 
Administration’s defense of drone attacks.315  This use of force emerged as a 
response to a serious strategic problem.  Al Qaeda and Taliban forces can 
readily move between Pakistan and Afghanistan, seeking to destabilize both 
countries.316  The situation prior to the drone attacks produced an asymmetry 
favoring these groups: they had freedom of action, while United States 
forces had limited options.  Along with this strategic dilemma, the 
Administration confronted a legal conundrum.  Self-defense was the best 
rationale for strikes against the destabilizing al Qaeda and Taliban forces; 
but under conventional views, international law requires an imminent threat 
providing “no moment for deliberation.”317 
 
In addition, reports indicate that the Administration attached no special weight to OLC’s opposition, 
but merely treated OLC’s view as one of a number of competing sources of advice.  Morrison, Libya 
Hostilities, supra, at 66.  In short, the Administration’s position exceeded the bounds of the dialogic 
equipoise model. 
 312.  Indeed, the Bush Administration seemed to recognize that congressional approval would not 
be forthcoming, since senior officials kept the interrogation program secret, even from other 
Administration lawyers.  See MARGULIES, supra note 10, at 61. 
 313.  See JANE MAYER, THE DARK SIDE: THE INSIDE STORY OF HOW THE WAR ON TERROR 
TURNED INTO A WAR ON AMERICAN IDEALS 105–06 (2008) (discussing how veteran FBI 
interrogators used traditional, lawful interrogation techniques to get information from suspected 
terrorist Ibn al-Shaykh al-Libi). 
 314.  See WALDRON, supra note 131, at 20, 28–32 (discussing countervailing factors); Daniel 
Kanstroom, Law, Torture, and the “Task of the Good Lawyer”—Mukasey Agonistes, 32 B.C. INT’L 
& COMP. L. REV. 187, 194–97 (2009) (same).  See generally Deborah L. Rhode, Ethical 
Perspectives on Legal Practice, 37 STAN. L. REV. 589 (1985) (discussing the importance of lawyers’ 
consideration of long-term values). 
 315.  See Administration and International Law, supra note 142; cf. Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. 
Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2010) (ruling that petitioner, the father of an American citizen in Yemen, who 
was allegedly targeted by the United States, lacked standing, and that the matter presented a political 
question). 
 316.  See Jane Perlez, Pakistan’s Military Chief Criticizes U.S. Over a Raid, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 
2008, at A8. 
 317.  This definition comes from Secretary of State Daniel Webster’s response to the Caroline 
episode, in which the British attacked a ship near Niagara Falls which had previously conducted 
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This conventional view allowed terrorists to game the system.  Viewed 
ex ante, the imminence test does not deter terrorists, who unlike states have 
no “return address.”318  While a state’s fixed location permits retaliation by 
victims of aggression, transnational terrorist groups like al Qaeda can melt 
away and reconstitute themselves to plan subsequent attacks.319  As al Qaeda 
demonstrated when it followed up the Kenya and Tanzania Embassy 
bombings with the attack on the USS Cole and September 11, while future 
attacks are not necessarily “imminent” in the conventional sense, recent 
history leaves little doubt of the group’s capacity and intent.  The United 
Nations has not codified a substitute to the conventional understanding.320  
However, one can read measures enacted by the international community 
after September 11 as authorizing a broadened conception of self-defense.321  
 
raids into Canada.  See Letter from Daniel Webster, U.S. Secretary of State, to Henry Fox, British 
Minister in Washington (Apr. 24, 1841), available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/ 
br-1842d.asp#web1.  The United Nations Charter arguably codifies the Caroline standard.  See U.N. 
Charter art. 51. 
 318.  See William C. Banks & Peter Raven-Hansen, Targeted Killing and Assassination: The U.S. 
Legal Framework, 37 U. RICH. L. REV. 667, 679–81 (2003) (arguing that the use of force was 
appropriate under international law); Robert Chesney, Who May Be Killed? Anwar Al-Awlaki as a 
Case Study in the International Legal Regulation of Lethal Force, 13 Y.B. INT’L HUMANITARIAN L. 
3 (2010); James A. Green, Docking the Caroline: Understanding the Relevance of the Formula in 
Contemporary Customary International Law Concerning Self-Defense, 14 CARDOZO J. INT’L & 
COMP. L. 429, 463–69 (2006) (noting the importance of flexibility in the definition of imminence); 
Jordan J. Paust, Self-Defense Targetings of Non-State Actors and Permissibility of U.S. Use of 
Drones in Pakistan, 19 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 237 (2010) (arguing that the use of force was 
appropriate under international law); Oscar Schachter, The Extraterritorial Use of Force Against 
Terrorist Bases, 11 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 309 (1989) (same).  In contrast, opponents of the new 
Administration’s policy argued for a narrow reading of Webster’s test and rights of self-defense.  See 
Extrajudicial Summary, supra note 142, ¶ 45 (discussing the Caroline standard); O’Connell, supra 
note 142, at 15 (arguing that the use of force to disable terrorist groups planning subsequent attacks 
is not truly “defensive” in character, but amounts to “unlawful reprisal”); cf. Richard Murphy & 
Afsheen John Radsan, Due Process and Targeted Killing of Terrorists, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 405 
(2009) (arguing that due process should govern targeting killing). 
 319.  See Administration and International Law, supra note 142 (noting that a terrorist group such 
as al Qaeda “does not have conventional forces, but . . . plans and executes its attacks against us and 
our allies while hiding among civilian populations”). 
 320.  See U.N. Charter art. 51. 
 321.  For example, Security Council Resolution 1373 stipulates that member states should 
“combat [terrorism] by all means” and “cooperate . . . to prevent and suppress terrorist attacks and 
take action against perpetrators of such acts.”  See S.C. Res. 1373, pmbl., ¶ 3(c), U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001).  As another example of this changing repertoire, consider the evolving 
consensus on Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Convention, which confers privileged combatant 
status on members of groups that commit violence in the course of “fighting against colonial 
domination and alien occupation and against racist regimes.”  See Protocol Additional to the Geneva 
Conventions of 12 Aug. 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed 
Conflicts (Protocol I), art. 1, ¶ 4, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3.  Before September 11, the United 
Nations General Assembly had repeatedly endorsed Protocol I.  See Michael A. Newton, 
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State Department Legal Adviser Harold Koh, in his defense of drone attacks, 
acknowledged limits imposed by the principles of distinction and 
proportionality, which require that officials refrain from targeting civilians 
and minimize collateral damage.322  Interpreting international law as both 
dynamic in the face of new challenges and safeguarding abiding values such 
as the protection of civilians, Koh served in the best tradition of national 
security lawyering. 
The Administration’s drone policy is also a worthy example of dialogic 
equipoise because of the steps the Administration took to ensure that the 
policy was authorized by Congress and understood by the international law 
community.  Koh spoke publicly about the rationale for the United States’ 
approach, allowing those who disagreed to state their reasons.323  The drone 
strategy, Koh argued, was permitted under the Authorization for Use of 
Military Force (AUMF),324 which was passed shortly after the September 11 
attacks and empowered the President to take all necessary and appropriate 
steps to prevent future attacks by al Qaeda.325  The Obama Administration 
also engaged with international law as an evolving body of jurisprudence.326  
This engagement contrasted with the Bush Administration’s dismissal of 
treaties like the Geneva Convention as “quaint” and “obsolete.”327  
Furthermore, the new Administration consulted a range of intra-branch 
 
Exceptional Engagement: Protocol I and a World United Against Terrorism, 45 TEX. INT’L L.J. 323, 
344–47 (2009) (discussing enactment of Protocol I).  After September 11, an international consensus 
emerged around denial of immunity from criminal prosecution for terrorist groups, reflecting the 
United States’ refusal to ratify Protocol I and the reservations noted by other countries in the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).  See id. at 360–70. 
 322.  See also Peter Bergen & Katherine Tiedemann, No Secrets in the Sky, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 
2010, at A23 (citing statistics that drone attacks run by the Central Intelligence Agency in Pakistan 
kill five confirmed terrorists for every civilian).  Presumably Koh, and not OLC, coordinated the 
defense of drone attacks because of the salience of international law questions.  Similar legal arguments 
support the raid that resulted in the killing of Osama bin Laden.  See Jeremy Pelofsky & James Vicini, 
Bin Laden Killing was U.S. Self-Defense: U.S., REUTERS (May 4, 2011), http://www.reuters.com/ 
article/2011/05/04/us-binladen-selfdefense-idUSTRE74353420110504 (reporting on the testimony of 
Attorney General Holder before the Senate Judiciary Committee); Kenneth Anderson, Time for 
Secretary Clinton to Call Her Lawyer?, OPINIO JURIS (May 6, 2011, 6:06 PM), http://opiniojuris.org/ 
2011/05/06/time-for-secretary-clinton-to-call-her-lawyer/ (summarizing arguments). 
 323.  See generally Administration and International Law, supra note 142. 
 324.  Authorization for Use of Military Force in Response to the 9/11 Attacks, Pub. L. No. 107-
40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001). 
 325.  See Administration and International Law, supra note 142; cf. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 
507, 516–18 (2004) (relying on AUMF); Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Congressional 
Authorization and the War on Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2047 (2005) (discussing impact of 
AUMF). 
 326.  See generally Administration and International Law, supra note 142. 
 327.  See Memorandum from Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to President, to the President, 
Decision Re Application of the Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War to the Conflict with Al 
Qaeda and the Taliban (Jan. 25, 2002), in THE TORTURE PAPERS: THE ROAD TO ABU GHRAIB 118–
19 (Karen J. Greenberg & Joshua L. Dratel eds., 2005). 
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experts, including Legal Adviser Koh.328  Indeed, Koh’s distinguished 
pedigree as a critic of unilateral executive moves and American rejection of 
mainstream international law enhanced the Administration’s credibility.329 
C.  Capping Expansive Advice on Executive Power 
Capping OLC’s expansive presidential power opinions would 
complement the substantive standard and provide a further bulwark against 
abuse.  Abuse occurs in two forms: overt reliance on inherent presidential 
power and use of the avoidance doctrine to narrowly construe statutes that 
might otherwise trench on the President’s supposed prerogatives.330  A cap, 
which OLC could adopt as a best practice,331 would limit the number of 
times in a given period that OLC could invoke the inherent power of the 
President or invoke the avoidance canon to narrowly construe a statute that 
limits executive discretion. 
A cap on OLC opinions expanding presidential power would work in 
the following way: in each two-year period, OLC could issue three 
opinions332 using the substantive test set out above, that either supported 
inherent presidential power or interpreted statutes narrowly to avoid 
ostensibly unconstitutional constraints on executive power.  If OLC failed to 
stay within this cap, it could issue more opinions upholding executive 
power, but only if those opinions met the absolutists’ test of objective 
interpretation.  If OLC could not match the executive’s preferred course with 
this more rigorous test, it would commit itself to not rendering a favorable 
opinion.  This would not necessarily preclude the President from going 
forward.  The President could overrule OLC’s constitutional interpretation333 
 
 328.  See Morrison, Libya Hostilities, supra note 311. 
 329.  See HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION: SHARING POWER 
AFTER THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR 96 (1990) (describing Roosevelt’s destroyer deal with Britain as 
“notorious”); cf. ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE EXECUTIVE UNBOUND: AFTER THE 
MADISONIAN REPUBLIC 142–44 (2010) (suggesting that presidents gain credibility when they 
appoint advisors with contrary views). 
 330.  See Morrison, Constitutional Avoidance, supra note 106. 
 331.  See Barron Memo, supra note 256.  Congress could not impose a cap, although it could 
perhaps ask for internal findings subject to follow-up by the House or Senate Intelligence Committee 
Chair or ranking member.  Cf. Kathleen Clark, Congress’s Right to Counsel in Intelligence 
Oversight, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 915 (arguing that the members of Congress on intelligence 
committees have a right to advice from staff lawyers, even though legislation limits access to 
sensitive information to members themselves). 
 332.  The opinions would have to be on discrete matters to avoid omnibus opinions that would 
evade the cap. 
 333.  See Morrison, Stare Decisis in OLC, supra note 1.  Sometimes, the President may even be 
right.  See Robert H. Jackson, A Presidential Legal Opinion, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1353 (1953) 
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or dismiss OLC’s head and find a more pliable individual for the job.  
However, the cap would supply a bump in the road, and signal to observers 
both within and outside the Executive Branch that the President was on 
shaky ground.  Although a President could still embrace the “go it alone” 
option by using White House Counsel, OLC’s implicit finding that the 
President’s position lacked support would be a marker for other officials and 
for the public. 
A cap would further dialogic equipoise by forcing the President and 
OLC to carefully budget their most sweeping arguments.  This would 
prompt insight about these arguments’ unintended effects, while still 
granting the President flexibility to use OLC in exigent circumstances.  A 
president like George W. Bush, who uses power in a profligate fashion, 
eventually finds himself without credibility with constituencies and 
stakeholders that matter, including Congress, the courts, and the legal 
community.334  While profligate exercises of power work for a time, they 
have serious long-term consequences.  They can result over time in a 
diminution of presidential authority, as actions spark a counterreaction in a 
never-ending cycle.  Sweeping exercises of power can also lock in future 
presidents to policy initiatives that have outlived their usefulness.  For 
example, Bush’s sweeping exercises of power in short order produced the 
detention facility of Guantanamo Bay, which became a global metaphor for 
presidential excess.  The symbolism of the facility damaged not only the 
President’s credibility, but that of the United States.335  However, the 
alarming speed with which Bush Administration officials built the place336 
contrasts with the difficulties encountered in closing it.  Guantanamo has 
been “Humpty-Dumpty in reverse: easy to assemble, but very difficult to 
take apart.”337  Caps on invocation of presidential authority by OLC would 
limit the damage, while still allowing invocation of authority in cases where 
no alternative existed. 
Despite the recent outcry over proposed “cap-and-trade” legislation, 
caps have worked well in environmental law.  With a cap in place, producers 
have to deliberate more carefully over their output.338  The cap regime 
 
(discussing President Roosevelt’s position, contrary to Jackson’s own, that the Lend-Lease provision 
allowing Congress to suspend aid to Britain through legislative veto was invalid; the Supreme Court 
agreed in INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983)). 
 334.  See GOLDSMITH, supra note 4, at 206–07. 
 335.  See Exec. Order No. 13,492, 74 Fed. Reg. 4897, § 2(b) (Jan. 22, 2009), available at 
http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/eo/eo-13492.pdf. 
 336.  See KAREN GREENBERG, THE LEAST WORST PLACE: GUANTANAMO’S FIRST 100 DAYS 45–
47 (2009) (discussing the drafting of legal opinions after September 11 advising that Guantanamo 
detentions would not be subject to judicial review). 
 337.  See MARGULIES, supra note 10, at 160. 
 338.  Cf. John S. Applegate, Bridging the Data Gap: Balancing the Supply and Demand for 
Chemical Information, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1365, 1398–404 (2008) (analyzing market-based strategies); 
Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Should Greenhouse Gas Permits Be Allocated on a Per Capita 
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creates an incentive to develop new techniques that have fewer ecological 
consequences.339  Moreover, because a cap in environmental law does not 
bar older technologies, but merely obliges producers to internalize 
ecological costs, it yields greater flexibility than an outright prohibition.340  
This incentive for innovation can also harmonize executive practice with 
constitutional norms.341 
A cap of this kind is also merely a codification of practices that lawyers, 
courts, and agencies engage in with some frequency to develop and conserve 
institutional capital.  Lawyers who are repeat players in litigation or 
transactional work often consciously ration their arguments, tailoring their 
positions to those that will command respect from other repeat players.342  
By cultivating a reputation for reasonableness, lawyers find it easier to 
achieve their client’s goals.  Lawyers also have the authority to pick and 
choose among legal arguments so that they can select arguments that are 
most likely to persuade an appellate tribunal or reviewing court, even if 
other arguments are colorable and ethically defensible.343  This capacity 
allows lawyers to marshal arguments for a client despite the client’s short-
term insistence on making every argument in the book.  United States 
Attorneys insist on a measure of independence from Washington for related 
reasons: a reputation for independence helps cement the prosecutor’s 
reputation with federal judges, who could derail prosecutions if they believe 
the prosecutor was politically motivated or blindly following directives from 
Washington.344  Indeed, in many situations a prudent client will find a 
lawyer known for a reasonable approach that meshes with that of other 
repeat players—the dominance in white-collar criminal defense of former 
 
Basis?, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 51 (2009) (discussing the mix of ex ante and ex post effects in a cap-
and-trade regime). 
 339.  See Posner & Sunstein, supra note 338, at 52 (noting that a cap-and-trade system might be 
“the most effective and efficient method of reducing emissions”). 
 340.  See Robert W. Hahn, Climate Policy: Separating Fact from Fantasy, 33 HARV. ENVTL. L. 
REV. 557, 590 (2009) (arguing that a cap on emissions would promote innovation). 
 341.  Cf. Margulies, Judging Myopia in Hindsight, supra note 163, at 237–44 (advocating an 
“innovation-eliciting” model to determine availability of Bivens actions in national security cases). 
 342.  See Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Disputing Through Agents: Cooperation and 
Conflict Between Lawyers in Litigation, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 509 (1994); cf. Stephanos Bibas & 
William W. Burke-White, International Idealism Meets Domestic-Criminal-Procedure Realism, 59 
DUKE L.J. 637, 658–59 (2010) (discussing the screening of arguments that encourages trust between 
repeat players in the criminal justice system). 
 343.  See Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 749–50 (1983). 
 344.  See John Gleeson, Supervising Federal Capital Punishment: Why the Attorney General 
Should Defer When U.S. Attorneys Recommend Against the Death Penalty, 89 VA. L. REV. 1697, 
1716–22 (2003) (federal judge discusses how prosecutorial charging decisions signal appreciation of 
local conditions, including sentiments of jury pool). 
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prosecutors testifies to the importance of signaling that one has a track 
record that merits trust.345  These lawyer practices amount to informal 
caps—they are not expressly quantitative, as the cap here would be, but they 
limit the kinds of arguments that lawyers make. 
Courts are also concerned with marshaling institutional capital.  As 
Bickel observed, doctrines such as standing, mootness, ripeness, and 
political questions conserve judicial capital for the most pressing 
occasions.346  Brandeis, who was not reticent about intervention,347  
nonetheless cautioned that the Court should decide matters on the narrowest 
ground available.348  Moreover, courts shape substantive decisions to avoid 
unnecessary strife with the political branches.  Courts may break new 
ground in doctrine, and then trim back remedies.349  In recent national 
security cases, for example, courts have granted detainees significant 
procedural rights, but declined to extend damages remedies against officials 
who have allegedly denied detainees those rights in the past.350  Some 
scholars have suggested that this balance has erred on the side of caution,351 
but the Supreme Court’s goal has avowedly been to avoid the “pendular 
swings” that make government unmanageable.352  A cap would help OLC 
maintain this constitutional equilibrium. 
 
 345.  Cf. Gerard E. Lynch, Our Administrative System of Criminal Justice, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 
2117, 2120–21 (1998) (discussing the dynamics of plea bargaining in the federal system, which 
hinges on signals that inspire mutual trust); Daniel C. Richman, Cooperating Clients, 56 OHIO ST. 
L.J. 69, 89–100 (1995) (discussing the benefit to the defendant of cooperation with government, 
aided by a lawyer whose pedigree signals trustworthiness). 
 346.  See Alexander M. Bickel, The Supreme Court, 1960 Term—Foreword: The Passive Virtues, 
75 HARV. L. REV. 40 (1961); cf. Neal Kumar Katyal, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld: The Legal Academy 
Goes to Practice, 120 HARV. L. REV. 65, 84–94 (2006) (describing how one advocate used Bickel’s 
approach to persuade the Supreme Court to reject President Bush’s unilateral establishment of 
military commissions as a radical step).  But see Jenny S. Martinez, Process and Substance in the 
“War on Terror,” 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1013, 1051–53 (2008) (arguing that the incremental 
approach emboldened the Executive Branch); Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Constitutional 
Showdowns, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 991, 1041–43 (2008) (suggesting that Bickel’s approach may be 
counterproductive when a showdown now will lower decision costs later). 
 347.  See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375–77 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (setting 
out First Amendment concerns with a prohibition of membership in political group). 
 348.  See Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 345–48 (1936) (Brandeis, J., 
concurring). 
 349.  See Goldsmith & Levinson, supra note 285, at 1810–16 (noting the interaction between 
substantive doctrine, remedies, and politics); Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial 
Equilibration, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 857, 884–85 (1999) (pointing out that over time courts define 
rights, such as those to nondiscriminatory public education or freedom from cruel and unusual 
punishment, to promote manageable remedial regimes); cf. FALLON, supra note 188, at 49–50 
(noting the role of manageability in shaping of doctrine). 
 350.  See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009). 
 351.  See Martinez, supra note 346, at 1054–61. 
 352.  See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 742 (2008) (striking down the habeas-stripping 
provisions of the Military Commissions Act of 2006). 
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VII.  CONCLUSION 
OLC built up institutional credibility over time, and lost much of it 
within a period of eighteen months after September 11.353  During that 
period, neither OLC nor its government clients paid sufficient attention to 
OLC’s long-term institutional role.354  Since that point, commentators have 
been eager to fill the gap.355 
Reform, however, is an elusive goal for an institution like OLC, whose 
mission resists pigeonholes and job descriptions.  Moreover, reformers have 
to consider a range of sometimes competing concerns.356  Most observers 
agree that a climate of categorical impunity would trigger a recurrence of the 
problems that led to this pass.357  But that still leaves a wide range of 
options. 
In curbing impunity, reformers also have to consider the countervailing 
risks of procedural injustice, paralysis, and polarization.358  A failure to 
consider each risk will derail reform efforts.  Procedural rights like notice, 
for example, undermine the case for sanctions.359  Treating these rights as 
mere annoyances to be tossed aside would surely constitute poetic justice for 
former officials like John Yoo who show rights similar disdain.  However, it 
would compromise a transition back to the rule of law.360  Grand structural 
overhauls like Ackerman’s Supreme Executive Tribunal would undermine 
the separation of powers that ensures democratic accountability.361  The 
result would be the worst of both worlds: the rigidity of the courts coupled 
with the strategic behavior that typifies the political branches. 
Decisional approaches that modify the substantive standard and 
deliberative processes of OLC have the most promise.  Disclosure is a vital 
safeguard for responsible deliberation, while stare decisis is often a valuable 
aid to stability and the rule of law.362  However, these decisional approaches 
also have perils: an absolutist objective standard, for example, breaks down 
in practice, given the imperatives that national security lawyers confront in 
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episodes such as the destroyer deal with Britain.363  Mandating the analysis 
of counterarguments can be either an inadequate constraint, as in the case of 
advice to commit genocide, or a subjective factor that varies with the 
evaluator’s opposition to an opinion’s substantive conclusions.364 
To address the risks of procedural injustice, paralysis, and polarization, 
this Article has proposed a model of dialogic equipoise.365  The model 
recognizes that OLC is an important player in American constitutionalism, 
which must balance the need to conserve institutional capital with the need 
to spend that capital in exigent circumstances.  OLC must maintain capital 
with two crucial audiences: the legal community, including the courts, which 
must believe that OLC can constrain the President, and the President, who 
can go elsewhere for advice if OLC mistakes risk aversion for the rule of 
law.366  To facilitate this balance, this Article has proposed a hybrid 
approach that combines a substantive standard with a deliberative 
approach.367  OLC may issue opinions that expand executive power and 
fulfill three criteria: the opinions must address sovereignty- or human rights-
centered problems, be reasonably likely to obtain ratification, and respect 
independent constitutional guarantees.368  The substantive standard assures 
that opinions expanding executive power will respond to grave exigencies 
and will be subject to timely disclosure.369  At the same time, a cap will limit 
issuance of such opinions, encouraging OLC to marshal its institutional 
capital for those occasions when no alternatives will do the job.370 
The dialogic equipoise approach will not please everyone.  Those who 
see formal sanctions as a prerequisite for a successful transition will regard 
anything less as a failure of accountability.  Champions of structural change 
will see the proposal here as an inadequate response to a fundamental 
problem.  However, perhaps these critics, like the officials whose work they 
rightly deplore, are prisoners of an unduly parsimonious narrative.  Vice 
President Cheney and his acolytes viewed the last quarter century as a saga 
of the Presidency hobbled by legal requirements.371  Ackerman tells the tale 
just as starkly, but with the opposite trajectory, as a story of the Presidency 
undermining legal restraints.372  Between these competing narratives, an 
approach like dialogic equipoise can help OLC do its crucial work. 
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